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domains of law deal with mixed motives? Are we condemned by our darkest motive, forgiven ac-
cording to our noblest, or something in between? This Article conducts a sweeping examination
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ysis is far more workable than commonly believed.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal results often turn on motive. Bosses are permitted to fire employees for
absenteeism, but not because of racial animus.' School boards may constitution-
ally ban books if concerned about "educational suitability," but not "simply be-
cause they dislike the ideas contained in those books."2 Money or property can
be given tax-free if the giver "proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested gen-
erosity,"' but it is taxable income to the recipient if some sort of business ad-
vantage is sought.'
Yet human beings are complex, and our motivations are often mixed.' Intro-
spection reveals that we often act for several conscious motives, not to mention
the unconscious impulses we do not ourselves notice.' The complications grow
geometrically when we seek the motives of an organization or group - like "Proc-
tor Hospital," 6 "Congress,"' or "the voters of California."'
While concern for motive is universal, the law's treatment of mixed motives
is neither uniform nor well theorized. Consider again the examples from the first
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2(a)(1) to (2) (2012).
2. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982).
3. Comm'r. v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1960) (quoting Comm'r. v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243,
246 (1956)).
4. See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 121 (London,
MacMillan & Co. 1883) ("[A] man's motives for any given act ... are always mixed."); see also
Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate
Treatment Law, 94 GEo. L.J. 489, 491 (20o6) (asserting that mixed motives employment dis-
crimination cases are "likely the lion's share of cases").
5. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Dis-
crimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164-65 (1995) (discuss-
ing cognitive bias as a source of discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (dis-
cussing unconscious motivations in racially discriminatory actions).
6. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 419-20 (2011) (considering whether the bias of an em-
ployee is attributable to his employer, Proctor Hospital).
7. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (declining to consider whether the
motives of several congressmen can be attributed to the entire body). Compare Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 239, 244-45 (1992) (arguing against the sensibility of an intent inquiry for a collective
body), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 523, 537-41 (2016) (articulating three seemingly feasible intent inquiries applicable to
Congress).
8. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052,1093 (9th Cir. 2012) (scrutinizing the purpose motivating Prop-
osition 8, a ballot initiative to bar same-sex couples from marrying), vacated on other grounds
and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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paragraph, but imagine that the boss, school board, or gift giver acted for both
motives mentioned rather than just one. How would such a mixed motive de-
fendant be judged? The boss would lose an employment discrimination suit'
and the school board would win a constitutional challenge,o while the tax lia-
bilities are unknowable on these facts." A small turn of the kaleidoscope gives
altogether different results: the boss would win despite her mixed motives if the
discrimination were because of age or disability rather than race,12 and the gov-
ernment board might lose if it were stacking electoral districts rather than library
shelves. 1
Is there any order here at all, or is the law of mixed motives as idiosyncratic,
elusive, and complex as motivation itself? Why are we sometimes forgiven ac-
cording to our noblest aspirations and other times condemned according to our
darkest?
In part, the varied treatment of motives, from one legal question to another,
is just the natural fruit of common-law rulemaking. As Walter Blum writes, "The
fact is that some of our statutory rules that apparently classify on a state of mind
basis do not indicate what magnitude of the relevant qualifying purpose is suffi-
cient."14 Our motives jurisprudence therefore springs from the minds of judges,
and judges do not always agree.
Yet the jurisprudential disorder seems to run especially deep when mixed
motives are involved. Circuit splits are ubiquitous," compelling the Supreme
9. See infra note 42 and accompanying text; see also infra Section III.A.2.
10. See infra note 183.
n1. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text; see also infra Section III.A.2.
13. See infra note 1oo and accompanying text.
14. Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485,
507 (1967). The absence of legislative guidance is ironic to those who have argued that legis-
latures are better positioned than courts to "attend to motives." E.g., Antony Duff, Principle
and Contraction in Criminal Law: Motives and Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIM-
INAL LAw: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 156, 177-78 (Antony Duff ed., 1998).
15. For example, when prosecutors are alleged to have unconstitutionally struck jurors for their
race or gender under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), there are now three different
rules for evaluating mixed motives. Compare Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d Sio, 815 (9 th Cit.
2010) ("motivated in substantial part" standard), with Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 30
(2d Cit. 1993) (but-for standard), and State v. Shuler, 545 S.E.2d 8o, Sii (S.C. 2001) (per se
standard). Prior to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), five different approaches
divided the circuits on Title VII identity discrimination. See Berl v. Cty. of Westchester, 849
F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cit. 1988) (substantial part test, with the burden shifted to the defend-
ant); Terbovirz v. Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cit. 1987) ("motivating factor" test, with
the burden shifted to the defendant); McQuillen v. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659,
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Court of the United States to decide a mixed motives case essentially every other
year. 16
But this judicial attention has not improved the quality of discourse concern-
ing mixed motives. Apart from a few headline opinions," courts typically offer
no justification for their treatment of mixed motives," or they import whole
doctrinal structures from other domains on an ad hoc basis.19 When courts do
justify their choice of motive standard, it is rarely by reference to policy goals.
The most common judicial rationale presents a false dichotomy, endorsing a
given standard because one alternative standard is unworkable.20 Courts rarely
acknowledge that there are more than two ways to analyze motives.2 1
664-65 (7 th Cir. 1987) (but-for test); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) ("discernible factor" test, with the burden shifted to the defendant in order to limit
the scale and scope of damages); Fadhl v. City & Cry. of S.F., 804 F.2d 1097, lo99 (9 th Cir.
1986) (but-for test, with the burden shifted to the defendants); Toneyv. Block, 705 F.2d 1364,
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same as Fadhl).
16. There were four cases from 2009 to 2016, and there have been seventeen cases since 1989.
This figure excludes the countless instances in which the Court acknowledges a mixed motives
circuit split but then declines to address it. See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754
n.6 (2016) (acknowledging but declining to decide the question of whether discriminatory
intent underlying a strike was nevertheless not "determinative" to the prosecution's decision
to exercise a strike); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2007) (same).
17. E.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
18. See, e.g., Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1,55, lo65 (3d Cir. 1997) (adopting an "at least in part" stand-
ard without any consideration of other possible motive standards); see also William A. Klein,
The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip -A Con-
ceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (1966) ("[C]ourts and commentators seem to
treat the primary purpose test as a matter of natural law rather than legislative command; at
least I have come across no case or commentary in which either its soundness or its statutory
basis has been closely examined."); cf Niblock v. Comm'r, 417 F.2d 1185, 1187 ( 7 th Cir. 1969)
(adopting a predominant purpose - or "dominant and primary motivation" - test to advance
"certainty" without explaining why this test is conducive to that goal).
ig. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (drawing on employment discrimination to inform jury
selection). See generally Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives
and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REv. 279, 295 (2007) (discussing the influence
of the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence upon jury selection cases).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (endorsing a but-for stand-
ard after rejecting only one other standard); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25
(1971) (rejecting all motive analysis because of problems with two motive tests, without con-
sidering other possible tests, such as the but-for test).
21. Even thoughtful commentaries manage to forget salient tests. E.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Cau-
sation: The Interpretation ofAction and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination
Law, 70 TEx. L. REv. 17 (1991) (listing five options, but neglecting the Primary Motive stand-
ard); Katz, supra note 4, at 499 (listing six causal concepts, but neglecting Primary Motive).
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If there is a failure of imagination as to the doctrinal options, it may represent
doctrinal parochialism. Courts seldom venture far from the instant controversy
in search of approaches to mixed motives, even though mixed motives questions
have been addressed in myriad domains: legal ethics, constitutional law (voter
districting, school desegregation, jury selection, free speech and censorship, tak-
ings), labor law, landlord-tenant law, intentional torts, vicarious liability, evi-
dence, property, health law, contract law, corporate law, employment discrimi-
nation, securities enforcement, taxation, bankruptcy, and more.22 A careful
understanding of mixed motivation would require a study of how mixed motives
work in each of these domains and why.
The academy could provide courts with guidance, but scholars rarely com-
pare one domain's motive rules to another,2 3 and no comprehensive comparison
has ever been published. Instead, scholarly interest in motive has mostly cen-
tered on the question of whether the law should care about motive at all.24 While
22. See infra Appendix B.
23. See infra Section I.B. But see Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New
Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1990) (comparing employment
to intentional interference with contractual relations, malicious prosecution, defamation, re-
taliatory eviction, and concurrent loss tort and contracts cases).
24. One longstanding debate concerns whether the criminal law does and should care about mo-
tives. Compare JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAwS (2d ed. 1960) (arguing
against motives analysis), with DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAw 144 (1987)
(arguing in favor of motives analysis). This debate has played out with renewed vigor with
respect to motive-based sentencing enhancements for bias and hate crimes. Compare Anthony
M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations ofBias Crime Statutes,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1015 (1997) (arguing against motives analysis), and Susan Gellman, Sticks
and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy
Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991) (arguing against criminal
ethnic intimidation laws), and Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred andPrej-
udice, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1081 (2004) (critiquing justifications of hate and bias crime legisla-
tion), with Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 89
(20o6) (proposing expanded role for motive in criminal sentencing), and Laurence H. Tribe,
The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and
Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 7 (defending hate crime legislation).
Similar questions arise in private law, which is frequently thought to disregard motive.
See, e.g., Nadav Shoked, Two Hundred Years of Spite, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 357, 360 (2016) (ar-
guing that property law does not and should not use motive analysis); see also J.B. Ames, How
Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of theActor, 18 HARv. L. REV. 411 (1905)
(arguing that tort law does and should incorporate motives analysis). But see THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CONTRACT 690 (1880) ("Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that
a wrong which in its own essence is lawful.").
Another area of deep controversy concerns the relevance of legislators' motives for the
purposes of judicial review of a statute. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to
1111
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extremely important, this discussion has occluded attention to our current prac-
tices. We debate whether to do something without a clear sense of how it is done.
This Article's ambition is to organize and categorize the law's many motive
tests, rationales, and policies. No prior work has attempted a transsubstantive
taxonomy and theorization of the role of mixed motives in the law. This project
is intended both to spur scholarly interest in our surprisingly undertheorized
jurisprudence of mixed motives and to empower courts and commentators as
they confront motives cases. It is not essential that all courts use the same mixed
motive standard in all cases, but it is essential that courts know what their op-
tions are, know what is at stake in the standard they select, and know how to
communicate the standard to future litigants. This Article is meant to help and
to draw other scholars into doing so.25
An operating premise of this Article is that the elusiveness of motives juris-
prudence is a barrier to its theorization. We are unaccustomed to comparing dif-
26ferent quanta of mental events, such as whether a defendant's bad motive was
"de minimis, more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, clear possibility
or a predominant motive."27 It is easy to conflate unfamiliar concepts,28 or to
equivocate as to the meaning of terms,29 unless we are clear about what we are
the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95 (defending motive-
based scrutiny); accord Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). Compare United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (asserting broadly that a law's constitutionality does not
depend on the motive that led Congress to enact it), with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-57
(1985) (holding a moment of silence law unconstitutional because the Alabama legislature's
motive was to further religion and return prayer to the public schools).
25. Cf Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts asApplied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710, 710-11 (1917) ("The great practical importance of accurate thought and precise
expression as regards basic legal ideas and their embodiment in a terminology not calculated
to mislead is not always fully realized ... [even by] many an experienced laVyer . . . .").
26. Klein, supra note 18, at 1108 ("Part of the problem is attributable to the deficiencies of our
means of communication about common mental phenomena.").
27. Crittenden v. Calderon, No. CIV-S- 9 5 -1 9 57 , 2011 WL 2619097, at *26 (E.D. Cal. June 30,
2011). This passage demonstrates both the challenge of categorizing motives, as well as the
risk of muddling motive-standard with standard of proof.
28. See, e.g., Jessica M. Scales, Tipping the Balance Back: An Argument for the Mixed Motive Theory
Under the ADEA, 30 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 229, 258 (2010) (conflating sole motive, but-
for motive, and a "defining" factor analysis).
29. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (endorsing one test and then applying
a different one); infra Section I.A. (discussing Hunter); see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (seemingly rejecting the but-for standard and then,
within the same paragraph, requiring it); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the
Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 292, 301 n.40
(1982) (calling the passage in McDonald "cryptic"); Robert S. Whitman, Note, Clearing the
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talking about, and clear in how we talk about it. A precise and value-neutral de-
scriptive vocabulary can help courts to identify what rules they are using, prac-
titioners to compare rules and predict outcomes, and scholars to reflect on the
meaning and desirability of rules.o
Despite being facilitative, this Article's framework is not an empty vessel. Ap-
plication of the descriptive vocabulary leads to important insights about the use
of mixed motive standards. Here are three such findings:
* Quantity: There are over one thousand clearly definable motive stand-
ards, about a dozen of which have much to recommend them. Yet only
four rules are commonly used by courts. The space of viable motive
standards is at once larger than scholars and courts realize, and yet small
enough for comprehension.
* Clarity: The most vexing issue for decades in mixed motive law-what
standard is actually used in employment discrimination cases -has a
clear answer.
* Workability: Mixed motive analysis is much easier than commonly
thought. Courts should be less reluctant to allow mixed motive analysis
because when they do it, they can cabin its scope to the pertinent issues.
This Article does not venture a comprehensive theory about when we should
use motive in our laws, nor about what motive standard is appropriate in a given
case," the appropriate stage in litigation for motive to be addressed,32 nor the
remedy appropriate after a motive standard is satisfied." This Article is meant
Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 863, 870 (1989) (accusing the Court in McDonald of having "contradicted itself"). With
even the Supreme Court unable to keep its terms straight for an entire opinion, stable rules
are unavailable to guide lower courts. Nor are courts alone in equivocating. Compare Tribe,
supra note 24, at 19-20 (using a "but/for" test), with id. at 31-32 (rejecting a "but/for" test).
30. The words "mixed motives" are often used pejoratively. See, e.g., ROBERT PHILIP, THE MAR-
THAS: OR, THE VARIETIES OF FEMALE PIETY 169 (1841) ("His eye was not single, even when his
hand was most active and liberal. Rachel was the first to discover his mixed motives, and not
slow to arraign them.").
31. For attempts to do so, see, for example, Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465 (2015),
which advocates for a more proimmigrant mixed motives test in asylum law; and Margaret E.
Johnson, Comment,A UnifiedApproach to Causation in Disparate Treatment Cases: Using Sexual
Harassment by Supervisors as the Causal Nexus for the Discriminatory Motivating Factor in Mixed
Motives Cases, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 231, which advocates for a harmonized approach to sexual
harassment disparate treatment claims.
32. See, e.g., Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive Frame-
work, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461 (2011) (discussing the points at which mixed motives
questions may be addressed).
33. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at554-58 (considering the consequences of a finding of forbidden
intent in the context of legislation).
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to be compatible with whatever normative commitments the law- or reader-
brings to its evaluation of motive.34
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly surveys mixed motivation in
the law, noting how little is settled, consistent, or defensible (let alone all three).
Part II develops a descriptive vocabulary for characterizing motives and motive
standards. Part III applies that vocabulary to draw descriptive conclusions about
motive analysis.
I. MOTIVE AS WE FIND IT
A. A Mixture of Motives Rules
The law often avoids consideration of mixed motives by denying the legal
relevance of motives at all," or by construing facts in a way that denies that mo-
tives are indeed mixed.3 6 Despite these avoidance techniques, motives analysis is
ubiquitous, and courts make use of a variety of standards for scrutinizing mixed
motives."
34. On other limitations woven into this Article's approach, see infra notes 66-So and accompa-
nying text.
35. See supra note 24.
36. For example, whether an asset is a security subject to federal regulation sometimes turns on
investment motive. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Some purchases,
such as of real property, frequently entail both a consumption and investment motive. William
J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital"
Test, 3o EMORY L.J. 73, 109-10 (1981). Courts typically avoid mixed motives analysis by read-
ing one motive out of the facts of the case. Either the "investors were attracted solely by the
prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their investments," United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975) (emphasis added), or else they were
"attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment," Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (em-
phasis added). It bears noting that both Howey and Forman involved real property: an orange
grove and an apartment, respectively.
37. See infra Appendix B.
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Unfortunately, courts tend to be less clear about the standard they adopt than
the standards they reject. A plaintiff is disqualified from leading collective corpo-
rate litigation if her motives are sufficiently impure," but courts do not require
utterly pure motives either," leaving us to guess where the line is. When bank-
ruptcy courts decide whether a creditor should be disenfranchised (or "desig-
nated") for using its votes in bad faith,4 0 we know that the standard is not
whether nobler motives would have led to different conduct, but we do not know
what the standard is. 1 We know that plaintiffs win an employment discrimina-
tion lawsuit if race, color, national origin, sex, or religion was a "motivating fac-
tor" for adverse treatment,4 2 but we do not know what a "motivating factor" is.4
38. Khanna v. McMinn, No. CIV.A. 205 45 -NC, 20o6 WL 1388744, at *43-44 (Del. Ch. May 9,
20o6) (disqualifying a mixed motives shareholder who was also a former officer engaged in
personal litigation with the company).
39. Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 761 (2d Cit. 1955); Youngman v. Tahmoush, 4 57 A.2d 376,
382 (Del. Ch. 1983) ("Though the plaintiff may well have in part a selfish motive in bringing
this action, which is not unusual, he will be permitted to continue to act on behalf of [the
class].").
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012).
41. See In re Landing Assoc., Ltd. 157 B.R. 791, 803 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) ("The standard is
both inherently fact-intensive and difficult to apply. . . ."). Further examples abound. See, e.g.,
Ozbum-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. 721 Logistics, LLC, 4o F Supp. 3d 437, 454 1-4 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (discussing civil conspiracy).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2(a)(1) to (2), (M) (2012). However, such plaintiffs win only limited
remedies (e.g., attorney's fees, injunction against further discriminatory practices). A tougher
"but-for" standard remains predicate to full recovery (e.g., compensatory damages or rein-
statement to the lost job), but the burden is on the employer to disprove the causal significance
of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(B) (A court "shall not award damages or issue
an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment" if the em-
ployer "demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the imper-
missible motivating factor."). Whitman points out that "the 'same decision' test is identical to
the 'but for' test, which asks whether the discrimination was the 'but for' cause of the adverse
action. Any distinction between the two is semantic only." Whitman, supra note 29, at 876
n.79; accord Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979).
The foregoing standard applies to only the five core Title VII identities (race, sex, religion,
national origin, and color). Military status likewise requires plaintiffs to show that discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor and then shifts the burden to defendants to show that the same
action would have occurred regardless. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (1) (2012). Prior to the enact-
ment of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, courts
imposed liability only if the employee was adversely affected "solely" because of her past, pre-
sent, or future enlistment. Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559 (1981). However, it
seems that employers successful in carrying their burden avoid all liability when discrimina-
tion is on the basis of military status. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 421 (2011)
("Thus, if the employer's investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to
the supervisor's original biased action (by the terms of USERRA it is the employer's burden
to establish that), then the employer will not be liable."); accord Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
1115
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
When the standard is clear, it may differ by forum. Prosecutors are forbidden
from striking jurors because of their race or gender,44 but what standard governs
mixed motive jury selection, when the prosecutor had both illegitimate and le-
gitimate reasons for striking? Most state courts would say that an iota of bias
taints the voir dire,45 while most federal courts offer less protection, deferring to
571 F.3 d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cit. 2009); Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, 75 R-3 d 98, io6 (2d Cit. 1996).
Thus, unlike Title VII discrimination, plaintiffs will not recover anything unless discrimina-
tion was a but-for cause of the adverse action. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment
Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REv. 1431, 1436 n.21 (2012).
In closely related suits, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving but-for causation from the
very start, with no burden shifting or partial remedies based on a "motivating factor." Those
related suits concern (a) retaliation for complaining about discrimination (even core Title VII
bias), (b) discrimination on the basis of age or disability, or (c) discrimination in non-em-
ployment contexts (e.g., obtaining an apartment or other commercial relation). Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012); see, e.g., Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 18o (2009) (holding that the Age Discrimination Act of 1967
is subject to the but-for standard). The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) amended
the ADA to prohibit discrimination "on the basis of " disability rather than "because of " disa-
bility, suggesting some difference from the language of Tide VII discrimination. This tough
test also applies to the five core Title VII protected statuses in non-employment contexts. For
example, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, all persons are afforded the equal right "to make and enforce
contracts," regardless of race. However, mixed motives discrimination in violation of this stat-
ute is covered by the tough "but-for" standard rather than the easier "motivating factor" of
the 1991 Act. See Wheat v. Chase Bank, No. 3:11-CV-309, 2014 WL 457588, at *12 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 3, 2014); see also Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (using the same "on
the basis of sex" phrasing as the ADAAA). There is some disagreement about whether the
ADA permits mixed motives analysis or whether mixed motives cases are instead shoehorned
into the framework set out in McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Compare
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3 d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (employing a mixed
motives analysis under the ADA), with Layman v. Alloway Stamping & Mach. Co., 98 Fed.
App'x. 369, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting disagreement among the circuits regarding mixed
motives under the ADA and disagreeing with Parker). And it applies in all retaliation suits,
where an employer takes adverse actions to punish or discourage employees from seeking re-
dress for discrimination. E.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (2013)
(applying the "traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test");
see also 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-3(a) (2012) (barring retaliatory employment actions); Gross, 557
U.S. at 18o (holding that the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 is subject to the but-for stand-
ard).
43. See infra Section III.A.2.
44. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that "gender, like race, is an unconsti-
tutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89
(1986) (" [T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race . . . .").
45. See, e.g., State v. Ornelas, 330 P.3 d 1085, 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (" [M]ost states have
adopted what is . .. referred to as the per se approach. . . ."); accord Owens v. State, 531 So. 2d
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prosecutors as long as there was also a good reason to strike the juror.4 6 A third
approach, applying a substantial-part standard to these Batson challenges, reigns
in the Ninth Circuit alone.4 7
Something about mixed motives makes the Supreme Court alternatively ret-
icent or maladroit in giving guidance. The Batson circuit split is an example of
the former: the Court has discussed the split twice in the last ten years, and in
both cases declined to address it.4 8 Other times, the Court addresses motives ju-
risprudence but sows more confusion than clarity. For example, in Hunter v. Un-
derwood, a racial disenfranchisement case, the Court seemingly endorsed one
mixed motive standard rather than another - then promptly applied the rejected
standard (erroneously, under the name of the endorsed standard).4
B. A Confusion of Concepts
The isolated cases in which courts grapple deeply with mixed motives remain
just that: isolated and uninformed by the lessons of other courts' experiences
with the same arguments. Consider the matter of tort causation analysis, the no-
tion that plaintiffs must show that their injury was caused by the defendant's il-
licit motives. This causation-focused approach has been terrifically influential.so
In Price Waterhouse, the most important employment discrimination case for
22, 23-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Rob-
inson v. United States, 878 A.2d 1273, 1284 (D.C. 2005); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865
(Ga. App. 1994); McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Ind. 2004); State v. Shuler,
545 S.E.2d 805, S1 (S.C. 2001); Payton v. Kearse, 495 S.E.2d. 205, 210 (S.C. 1998); State v.
King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
46. See Ornelas, 330 P.3 d at 1092 ("[S]ome states and most federal circuits have adopted a mixed
motives analysis, and the Ninth Circuit has adopted its own approach."); see also Gattis v.
Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2002); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir.
2001); King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F-3d 1271,
1274-75 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3 d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3 d 417, 421 (4 th Cir.
1995); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
47. Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3 d 810, 814-15 ( 9 th Cir. 2010) (applying a third approach, the "mo-
tivated in substantial part" standard); see infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
48. See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 n.6 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485
(2008).
49. 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). For extensive treatment of Hunter, see infra notes 126-137 and accom-
panying text.
50. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (using
causation to analyze a mixed motives First Amendment claim); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (evidence); Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1997) (jury
selection); NLRB v. Vemco, Inc., 989 F.2d 1468, 1478 (6th Cir. 1993) (labor law).
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mixed motives, every single Justice attempted to square his or her preferred mo-
tive standard with tort causal theories. 1
Scholars and jurists have been critical of this approach, arguing that it mis-
reads the statute and unwisely transplants tort doctrine without regard for the
subtleties of the instant legal question.52 Yet no one seems to have noticed that
these same skeptical arguments were first made by the very Justices to be tu-
tored: In 1972, Justice Blackmun wrote a majority opinion in which he rejected
the relevance of tort law's causal reasoning in a mixed motives case as based on
specious textual analysis" and ill founded in policy.54 He was joined in that opin-
ion by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White (Justice Rehnquist had recently
joined the Court but declined to join in any opinion). These five Justices re-
mained on the bench for Price Waterhouse, yet none cited his previous opinion.
Neither did any of the briefs, or subsequent scholars writing on the case. 5 Pre-
51. Some Justices required but-for causation. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Others note that something need not be "the" cause to be
"a" cause, id. at 242-45 (majority opinion), but they imposed a but-for test in order to qualify
for meaningful remedies. Id. at 242; id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 268 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); id. at 262 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Causation continues to influence devel-
opments in employment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.
Ct. 2517 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 21.
53. See United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 105 (1972) ("The Regulations' use of the word
'proximate' perhaps is not the most fortunate, for it naturally tempts one to think in tort
terms. The temptation, however, is best rejected, and we reject it here."). The regulation pro-
vided, "For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to be
determined by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears
to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate one in the conduct of
the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless,
the debt comes within the exception provided by that subparagraph." 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-
5 (b)(2) (2016).
54. See Generes, 405 U.S. at 103-05 (considering policy arguments why the tort concept of causa-
tion "has little place in tax law, where plural aspects are not usual, where an item either is or
is not a deduction, or either is or is not a business bad debt, and where certainty is desirable");
see also Weddle v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 849, 852 (2d Cit. 1963) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) ("To
import notions of proximate causation distilled from the great body of tort law into consider-
ation of [Section] 166 is of little value, because factors such as time, space, and foreseeability,
and the very basic notion of causation in fact which underlies the law of proximate causation
are by their nature incapable of application to a problem which requires dissection of different
motivations toward a similar objective.").
ss. But see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Com-
paring Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1283 n.182




THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MIXED MOTIVES
sumably the prior opinion went unnoticed because it addressed a tax law ques-
tion, and it never occurred to anyone that separate legal domains might struggle
with similar problems.5 6
It is not just a failure to compare that has limited the development of motives
jurisprudence. It is also a failure to be clear about what any given motive stand-
ard actually entails. It is hard to defend one motive standard against another if
you are not sure about the difference yourself, or if you doubt your ability to
convey subtle differences to jurors.1 7
Clarification is a distinctive contribution of the legal academy, and scholars
have given some attention to the jurisprudence of motives. Unfortunately, pre-
vious efforts at clarification have been incomplete or limited. Almost all of these
projects have looked exclusively at a single body of law" or just a few areas of
law." Many prior studies limited their scope of evaluation to categorically ex-
clude important patterns of mixed motives. 60
Another common pitfall is taking courts' word choice too seriously without
examining the realistic impact on the result.6 1 Should we conclude that "contrib-
uting factor" and "motivating factor" are different standards just because courts
used different words? Doing so threatens to give us as many standards as there
56. This is a shame, since tax has a particularly rich engagement with mixed motives. See, e.g.,
MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: ALAw STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING
CASES AND CONCEPTS 120 -22 (1977); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consump-
tion Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1585-86 (1979).
57. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2546 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing "but-for" tests as difficult for judges and juries); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (discussing concern for jury trials); id. at 292 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern for jury trials).
58. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 19 (discussing mixed motives in jury selection).
59. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 23 (comparing six areas: contractual relations, malicious prosecu-
tion, defamation, retaliatory eviction, and concurrent loss tort and contracts cases).
6o. See Katz, supra note 4, at 498 (ruling out "necessary, but not sufficient" cases as "unlikely to
occur in the context of decisionmaking, where the relevant acts (for example, consideration
of sex and consideration of tardiness) occur simultaneously" (emphasis omitted)); Weber,
supra note 23, at 499 (defining mixed motives cases as ones where "two causes, either of which
would alone cause the harm, operate simultaneously" thereby limiting the inquiry to what I
will later call Quadrant III).
61. E.g., Nancy M. Modesitt, Causation in Whistleblowing Claims, so U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1201-
10 (2016) (listing eight motive standard types without establishing that they actually entail
different results).
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are synonyms in a thesaurus.6 2 Separate designations are appropriate only if they
drive different results.6 3
Yet another drawback to previous approaches is their tendency to summarize
the range of motives (and motive standards) on a one-dimensional axis - for ex-
ample, from "least discriminatory" on the left to "most discriminatory" on the
right. However, mixed motives cases are a function of two independent variables
because the legal outcome turns on the status of the two motives. No single spec-
trum can compare (i) the strength of two motives, relative to some baseline, (ii)
the sum of their combined vectors, relative to the baseline, and (iii) their
strength relative to one another. 64 As a result, precision has been lost.65
62. See Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the terms "motivating
factor" and "substantial factor" are "interchangeable"); cf Katz, supra note 4, at 491 n.5 (listing
almost thirty different statements of the mixed motives standard in Hopkins).
63. One way to test this would be to see whether there are courts that say something to the effect
of, "Of course there was a contributing factor here, and that would establish liability in our
neighboring state. But not here, because it wasn't quite a motivating factor."
64. An alternative way of stating this claim is that no single scalar or statistic can accomplish all
three goals.
65. See, e.g., Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner
Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 85, 114-20 (1986). Stonefield is able to depict
the relative strength of two motives to one another, but his chart does not communicate the
absolute strength of the motives either individually or as a set. Therefore, a move toward the
"more racist" side of his chart is both compatible with increasing racist motivation and with
decreasing racist motivation (so long as nonracist motives are dropping even faster). Likewise,
any point on the scale is compatible with any absolute level of racist motive, so long as non-
racist motive is proportional. Thus, a but-for test or motivating factor test can be satisfied at
any point on his line. This is not a trivial error. It leads Stonefield to erroneously infer that
"determinative" racism (which means "but-for") is stronger racism than "substantial" racism
(which, in his language, means racism exceeding a minimum quantum of strength). Yet there
is nothing in his theory that guarantees this result. And failure to notice this bizarre result
may be what causes Professor Stonefield to define "substantial" as excluding trivial quantities.
Professor Brodin makes a similar move:
At one end of the spectrum is a test, specifically rejected by Congress, that requires
the plaintiff to establish that the unlawful factor was the sole factor behind the de-
cision. At the other end is a causal theory that prohibits a decision that was based
in part on an impermissible consideration even if a legitimate reason was also relied
on. In between is a test that would invalidate personnel action that was based in
substantial part on a discriminatory ground, and another that requires the plaintiff
to prove that the impermissible consideration was a determinative factor, i.e., a factor
that a made a difference in the ultimate result.
Brodin, supra note 29, at 293 (footnotes omitted).
The spectrum that makes "in part" a lesser point than "substantial part" is either a ranking
of the absolute strength of the motive or its strength relative to another motive. In either case,
there is no assurance that determinative (i.e., but-for) should be further out than substantial
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Lacking an effective vocabulary, courts cannot compare across fields and cir-
cuits, defend individual rules against one another, send clear instructions to
lower courts as to the applicable law, or even spot errors within their opinions.
Vague terms also elide the hard evaluative questions that might recommend one
rule rather than another. The next Part sets out the vocabulary needed to taclde
these problems.
II. A DESCRIPTIVE VOCABULARY
This Part sets out to build a descriptive vocabulary in which to situate motive
standards, to allow precise statements of existing and potential legal rules. It re-
mains agnostic on many key debates in law, philosophy, and psychology. In-
stead, what follows should structure discussions of motivation, regardless of
one's views on those questions.
Every model has its limitations, and this one is no exception. As an attempt
to clarify the existing law, it is particularly important for this Article itself to be
clear about its ambitions and limitations of scope. The nature of motive is hotly
debated in legal, psychological, and philosophical literatures. This Article does
not argue for particular resolutions to those debates. Given the diverse ap-
proaches employed by courts, no project of legal clarification can afford to be
dogmatic from the start. Wherever possible, this Article is meant to be ecumen-
ical and compatible with whatever assumptions courts currently make about mo-
tive. Nevertheless, this Article does operate with certain conceptions of motive
in mind, and it is important to be explicit about those conceptions.
part. A motive may be determinative, even if it is absolutely tiny and tiny relative to other
motives, if the other motive is not individually sufficient to motivate the result.
Professor Modesitt makes this same move and another. Modesitt, supra note 61, at 1202-
11. She ranks "but-for" as tougher than her "substantial factor" test. But then she puts both as
easier tests than a primary factor test. Id. at 1203-05. Yet a motive might be primary without
being determinative if even the secondary motive was strong enough to drive the result inde-
pendently. And a motive might be primary and yet insubstantial if numerous trivial motives
together added up to motivate the act.
Professor Katz does not make this error, but tempts his reader to make it when he asserts
that "it is hard to imagine that it would be significantly easier for plaintiffs to prove sufficiency
than it would be for them to prove necessity." Katz, supra note 4, at 51o n.85. He is right that
the bad motive is never larger for necessity than sufficiency, making necessity easier on that
axis. But necessity requires someone to confront the contribution of the other motive - suffi-
ciency does not require any such analysis. Whether it is easier to prove necessity than suffi-
ciency will depend on the plaintiff's ability to rebut claims about pressing legitimate motives,
and we have no general theory about the relative difficulty of those tasks.
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One familiar legal question concerns the relationship between motive and
other aspects of mens rea. This Article follows the orthodox distinction between
motive (i.e., why we act), and intent (i.e., whether we want to act and what we
want to do) .66 Yet courts commonly conflate motive, purpose, and intent. 67 And
some scholars problematize the distinction between intent and motive and treat
motive as merely a more distant or ultimate intent.68 This Article addresses why
individuals acted as they did, not what they wanted to do -if it turns out that
some "intents" or "purposes" are reasonably construed as dealing with why, then
those "intents" are "motives" for the purposes of this article.69
66. ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAROF
POLITICS 208-21 (2d ed. 1986) (distinguishing motive, a psychological fact, from intent or
purpose); Intent, BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014) ("While motive is the inducement
to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it."); STEPHEN, supra
note 4, at 110-12. Purpose is sometimes the same as motive, sometimes the same as intent, and
sometimes independent. Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law,
26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917) (distinguishing between intent, motive, and purpose). The Model
Penal Code distinguishes between various levels of culpability, from "negligently" to "reck-
lessly" to "knowingly" to "purposely." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2) (a)-(d) (AM. LAW. INST.
1962). This Article's analysis would seem to be applicable only when an actor proceeds pur-
posely.
67. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982) (conflating motive and in-
tent); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1980) (conflating motive and purpose); Palmer
v. Thompson 403 U.S. 217, 241 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (conflating motive and pur-
pose); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429 (1971) (conflating purpose and intent).
68. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 3.6(a),
at 229 (2d ed. 1986); JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE THEORY OF THE LAW
347 (3d ed. 1910) (defining motive as "ulterior intent"). Still others reject any effort to cate-
gorize these various concepts. John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Con-
stitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming ofBrown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 951 (1989) (noting the interchangeability of these
words in equal protection law).
69. Thus, I assume it is sensible to say that a teacher was fired because the school board wanted
to silence political dissent (motive), and that this is different from merely noting that the
firing was not the result of a clerical error (intent). I do not attempt to answer the question of
whether it is fruitful to characterize the action in terms of a highly specific intent (e.g., "the
board intended to fire a political dissenter") combined with a more generalized intent ("the
board sought to have a 'good' set of teachers"), except to say that my usage of motive should
still attach to this version of specific intent. For example, I take Professor Fallon's recent article
on legislative intent to nevertheless address material that this article analyzes as motive. Fal-
lon, supra note 7. On multiple overlapping characterizations of an action, see DONALD DA-
VIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 43, 57-61 (2001) (discussing the multiple
potential characterizations of any given action, many of which call attention to a different psy-
chological aspect of the actor).
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Second, what phenomena qualify as answers to the "why" question? Does
motive refer to facts about the world ("he could only survive by killing his at-
tacker"), reasons ("all reasonable people kill in self-defense"), or internal psy-
chological states ("he wanted to live") ?70 The conceptual status of motive has
been a central matter for philosophers of action. A closely related legal question
is whether, given that all internal mental states must be proven by recourse to
external circumstances anyway, we should generally regard the law as uninter-
ested in inner states such as motive." This Article's discussions presume that mo-
tives are a reason for action which an actor takes to be guiding.72 However, much
of this analysis should work even for philosophers or courts that think of motive
differently. Whatever motives are to be mixed-the felt desires of an actor, con-
siderations which would make a reasonable person feel those desires, etc. -we
need a rational way of describing and evaluating that mixture.
Presenting motives as a certain sort of reason naturally excludes unconscious
biases and urges as motives." That is not to deny the power that perception and
the subconscious have on us,74 so much as to develop a useful model of the way
70. A closely related question is whether the agent must "endorse" her motives in some way, or
whether unendorsed mental states may be relevant. See generally Angela M. Smith, Conflicting
Attitudes, Moral Agency, and Conceptions of the Self, 32 PHIL. TOPICS 331 (2004) (arguing against
the endorsement requirement).
71. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1894); see
also Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 659 (2001)
(making a similar claim regarding intent in antitrust law).
72. See Gudel, supra note 21, at 74 ("Motives, in sum, are a class or species of reasons for action.");
accord Owen M. Fiss,A Theory ofFairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,297 (1971); cf.
Byrne Hessick, supra note 24, at 95 (20o6) ("[A] defendant's motives are her reasons for act-
ing."); Walter Harrison Hitchler, Motive as an Essential Element of Crime, 35 DICK. L. REV. 1o5,
105 ("Motive is a desire prompting conduct."). And a reason is something that motivates rather
than justifies action. On the distinction, see JONATHAN DANCY, PRACTICAL REALITY (2000).
To the degree that something other than reasons are considered, such as problematic beliefs or
circumstances, the framework in this Article may or may not be useful.
73. See supra text accompanying note 5. See generally RICHARD PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVA-
TION 34-35 (1958) (distinguishing between conscious motives (i.e., "his reason") and poten-
tially subconscious motives (i.e., "the reason")). A vast psychological literature studies the
ways in which attitudes and factual perceptions can be subject to distortion or bias. It is there-
fore easy to imagine an employer firing an employee, thinking that the reason pertains only
to merit, but where the boss was more attentive to the employee's faults because of the boss's
unconscious reactions to the employee's race. Such cases are not the focus of this Article.
74. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology
of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 267-71 (2012) (discussing the ways in which perceptions
and conclusions may be influenced by "motivations" where motivations involve having a pre-
ferred outcome).
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that the law uses motive. It seems clear that the law generally takes only con-
scious motives as motives."
Another closely related question concerns causation.7 6 Should we regard mo-
tives as deterministically causing certain actions, or is there space for non-causal
free will?" Whether and how motives are part of the causal universe is a matter
of substantial debate." This Article avoids causal language whenever possible.
It seems that the organization of motive standards can be accomplished without
presuming a particular view of causation or determinism.
In addition to those various conceptual choices, this Article also makes
choices about how it is appropriate to describe motives." For example, it de-
scribes individuals as having one or two motives, even though it is plain that we
may have any number of motives.o It also describes particular motives as mat-
ters of degree rather than as binary; that is, once you admit to having a given
motive at all, it still makes sense to ask how much of that motive you have (or
how motivational it was to you). It may be that relaxing or modifying these as-
sumptions yields different insights or illuminates other problems, and such fol-
low-on work will be welcome. For now, these assumptions are sensible and yield
tractable results. We now turn to the model and its results.
75. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) ("In saying that gender
played a motiving part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at
the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one
of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.").
76. See Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 6o J. PHIL. 685 (1963) (arguing that rea-
sons cannot be causes).
77. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR±, CAUSATION IN THE LAw (1959) (examining causation in
law, but nevertheless rejecting determinism); see also, D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory
Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 6o S. CAL. L. REv.
733, 739 ("Motive is a causal concept."). But see Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of
Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 285 (Richard Gold-
berg ed., 2011) (embracing deterministic causation for human action).
78. See supra notes 5o-56 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
so. It seems that it will often be appropriate to group and sum the various A-Motives and (sepa-
rately) B-Motives. Then this model still allows comparison through its two-motive presenta-
tion. Yet one might wonder whether this is always appropriate. In a case with three equal
motives, each might be a but-for motive, yet none is in itself primary. The choice of how to
combine them is the choice of whether to find a Primary Motive at all. Such considerations
require greater attention than can be accomplished at this time.
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A. Components
Consider a variety of individuals differing in the structure of their motiva-
tions for a given action. Some individuals have just a single motive for a given
decision, and it is one that the law considers acceptable. It might be firing an
employee due to repeated absenteeism or selling a stock due to a sudden need
for cash. Let us call these acceptable motives A-Motives.
Can the strength of someone's A-Motives be measured, or can two individu-
als' A-Motives be compared? It may seem strange to compare two individuals'
motivational strengths or to compare a single individual's motivations over
time," and it may seem particularly strange to assign any kind of number to
motivational strength.8 2 Still, doing so will prove illuminating even if it is not
meant to literally describe human psychology.
Moreover, some quantification and comparison should feel familiar and rea-
sonable. We observe that some people subject to A-Motives act on them, and
some find them insufficiently motivating and do not act. Likewise, the same in-
dividual may act on A-Motives one day and not another. It would seem that some
motivations are sufficient to prompt action, and some are so weak as to be ig-
nored, particularly when there are costs to action. It may be acceptable to simply
define "1" as the level of A-motivation sufficient for action, and then to sort in-
dividuals as above or below that point based on our observation that they did or
did not take action." Figure 1 (Adam & Betty) depicts just such an arrangement
along the Y-axis.
81. Klein, supra note 18, at 11o8-o9.
82. The impossibility of interpersonal comparison of utility has been a defining feature of modem
economic thought. See, e.g., 3 ELIE HALEVY, LA FORMATION DU RADICALISME PHILOSOPHIQUE
481 n.55 (1904) (quoting Jeremy Bentham for the observation that "you might as well pretend
to add 20 apples to 20 pears" (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Dimensions of Happiness (un-
published manuscript) (on file with University College London))).
83. Katz distinguishes between strong sufficiency and weak sufficiency. Katz, supra note 4, at 497
n.25. Strong sufficiency is satisfied if the factor in question would have led to the observed
result irrespective of whether any other factors were subtracted. Weak sufficiency means that
the factor would have only caused the result with the other factors present. Katz addresses
only weak sufficiency in his article because he finds strong sufficiency to be a dubious concept.
What could cause a result without any help at all - without oxygen, for instance?
In this Article, I invoke neither strong nor weak sufficiency. Instead, I favor an interme-
diate position: a motive is sufficient if it would have led to the observed result even if other
contributing motives were subtracted. This is stronger than weak sufficiency because it asks
what would have happened in the absence of other background motives, but it is weaker than
strong sufficiency because it does not require that the motive would spur action even if other
nonmotive facts were greatly altered. Within this notion of sufficiency, it should be clear that
I am describing a sort of "independent sufficiency" even if I do not always use the word "in-
dependent."
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Adam possesses only A-Motive, and his A-Motive is greater than 1. By con-
trast, Betty also feels some desire to act to further her A-Motive, but the motiva-
tion is insufficient to actually spur action.8 4 Perhaps she considers firing an ab-
sentee employee but decides that she just does not care very much about the
84. Katz refers to individually insufficient motives, which are neither necessary nor sufficient, as
exhibiting "minimal causation." Katz, supra note 4, at 499. I avoid that term in part because I
wish to avoid endorsing without argument the controversial notion that motives must be
"causal" to be relevant. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of causation may prove useful to some readers, either because they subscribe to a causal
theory of motivation or because they are familiar with its terminology. For such readers, I
include the corresponding causal language as well. In such language, we might think of
Adam's A-Motive as a necessary and sufficient cause ofAdam's actions, while Betty's A-Motive
is neither necessary nor sufficient. In a counterfactual sense, removing Adam's A-Motive (and
only removing that motive) would change Adam's action, while removing Betty's A-Motive
alone would in no way change the results.
1126
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absences. Because Adam and Betty both care only about A-Motives, yet only
Adam takes action, we can state ordinally that Adam has greater A-motivation
than Betty and cardinally that Adam has A-motivation >1 and Betty has A-moti-
vation <1.
Not everyone has only A-Motives." Some individuals are motivated by
pursuit of B. B-Motives are ones that can qualify the defendant for adverse legal
treatment or which may be essential to a plaintiff's or prosecutor's case. Often-
times, B-Motives are bad motives, but not always.86 A taxpayer who purchases a
plane ticket primarily for a leisure motive will be denied a business expense tax
deduction, but that does not mean that leisure is bad or that Congress seeks to
discourage vacationing. 7 Figure 2 (Adam et al.) depicts several individuals' sali-
ent combinations of A-Motive and B-Motive, as well as two additional dashed
lines highlighting the magnitude of their various motives.
Of course, even Adam's A-Motive is not sufficient in the strongest sense, see supra note 83,
since Adam would not act if, say, all oxygen in the universe disappeared.
85. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 121 ("[A] man's motives for any given act ... are always mixed.").
But see MARCIAW. BARON, ICANTIAN ETHIcs ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY 152-55 (1999) (ques-
tioning the prevalence of mixed motives); Judith Baker, Do One's Motives Have To Be Pure?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS OF RATIONALITY: INTENTIONS, CATEGORIES, ENDS 457, 457-58
(Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner eds., 1986) (same).
86. See supra text accompanying note 30. Other times, A-Motives and B-Motives may both be
bad. See Hunterv. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,231(1985) (discussing how an unlawful motive -
disenfranchising blacks - was used as political cover for a lawful but distasteful motive - dis-
enfranchising poor whites). Note also that the relevant motive may not even be that of a party
to the litigation. Alpha's tax obligations may turn on Beta's motive in giving a putative gift,
even if Beta is not a party to the litigation- and even if Beta is no longer living. See, e.g., United
States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 ( 7 th Cir. 1991); see also Gupta, supra note 31, at 479 (noting that
asylum proceedings inquire into the motive of a persecuting government, though the parties
to the litigation are only concerned with the rights of an individual asylum seeker against U.S.
immigration officials).
87. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(b)(1) to (2) (1960) (considering whether the trip is primarily re-
lated to trade or business or primarily personal); see also United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118
(5th Cit. 1968) (evaluating an example of such a business trip).
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Charley has B -Motive >1, depicted by being to the right of the vertical dashed
line, and so Charley could be said to be sufficiently motivated to act based solely
on B-Motive. Yet, while B-Motive was sufficient for action, it was not Charley's
only motive. He also felt the pull of A-Motive, though not strongly enough to
have heeded it apart from the B-Motive." Charley is our first mixed motives
case.
88. If applying the language of tort causation, we would say that A-Motive was neither a necessary
nor a sufficient cause, while B-Motive was both necessary and sufficient. A cause is necessary
if the effect would not have occurred in the absence of that cause. In parallel, B-Motive is
necessary because Charley would not have acted if his B-Motive had been extinguished. It is
common to refer to necessary causes as but-for causes.
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Doreen is also motivated by more than one consideration. She blocks an em-
ployee's promotion both because the employee exhibits a brusque style and be-
cause the employee is female." Doreen would have acted for either reason, but
she happens to have been motivated by both. We might describe Doreen's act as
motivationally overdetermined, in that two motivations were each sufficient
without the other, and neither was individually necessary, to motivate her to ac-
tion.90
Eddy and Felicia also possess mixed motives. Yet they differ from Doreen con-
siderably. We don't need to label Eddy's "act" because there is in fact no act. Alt-
hough Eddy feels some pull from A and B alike, neither one is very strong at all.
Neither is sufficient for action by itself, and even together, they don't amount to
much. Eddy, like Betty, is on this chart to depict a possible pairing of motivations
that does not imply any action at all.
Felicia, on the other hand, feels two separate motives, either of which it
would be easy to disregard, but which together may seem compelling. She could
forgive the employee's absenteeism by itself, or his ethnicity by itself, but to-
gether, the camel's back breaks, and she is motivated to act.91 Her act is a hybrid
of two impulses, so we can call Felicia a hybrid case. 92 Neither impulse is inde-
pendently sufficient and both are therefore necessary to motivate her action. The
dashed line separating Eddy and Felicia indicates whether the sum of motives is
sufficient (>1) or not.
Doreen is a genuinely overdetermined case because both motives are suffi-
cient - independent of one another - to motivate the action.9' We can call Char-
ley a case of sole determination because one motivation is necessary and sufficient
89. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). The employee was described
as "unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff." Id. The head of Hopkins's
department told her to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.' Id. Another advisor suggested that she
take "a course at charm school." Id.
go. In the language of tort causation, this is analogous to a case of multiple sufficient causation.
91. The thought process may not be strictly additive, but A and B may cumulate to reach the
necessary threshold together. In any case, I will treat the process as additive for ease of expo-
sition.
92. My term follows Baron's treatment of Kant on mixed motives. See BARON, supra note 85, at
152-55. Some might refer to this zone as one of overdetermination, or of multiple necessary
causes, but I dislike those labels here. Overdetermination might suggest that either motive
would have sufficed independently to determine the action, which is not true. Multiple-cau-
sation invokes causation, which is controversial.
93. See J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 43-47, 164-65 (1974)
("[I]f it is in principle undecidable whether the chocolate would on this particular occasion
have come out if the shilling had not been put in, it is equally undecidable whether the putting
1129
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to determine action without any contribution of the other, but not the other way
around. 94 Eddy and Betty remain in a zone of nonaction.9' Figure 3 (Quadrants)
depicts the regions exemplified by these various characters.96
in of the shilling caused the appearance of the chocolate."); Louis E. Loeb, Causal Theories and
Causal Overdetermination, 71 J. PHIL. 525, 526 (1974) ("Cases of causal overdetermination seem
relatively different- two events, states of affairs, conditions, or objects seem to have an equal
claim to having played some one causal role"). Of course, no single cause is ever truly suffi-
cient to assure an effect. There are always other causes and background factors. Here, I really
mean that as far as motives go each motive was sufficient for the action.
94. In familiar causal terms, we could think of Charley's as a case of necessary and sufficient cau-
sation. A-Motive could be subtracted without any change (so it is not necessary, and B-Motive
is sufficient) and B-Motive also could not be subtracted lest the action be aborted (so it is
necessary, as well).
95. Or, rather, any action Eddy takes is not the result of motives A or B. If he acts, it is for some
other motive, or else it is motiveless action, such as a reflexive spasm.
96. To summarize this in familiar causal metaphors, overdetermination refers to two sufficient
but not necessary motives; sole determination refers to one necessary and sufficient motive









While we have so far concerned ourselves with the absolute strengths of mo-
tivations A and B, we might be interested in the relative strengths of A and B.
There may be times when it is valuable to notice whether one is much greater
than the other. The following Figure 4 (Relative Motives) divides the motiva-
tional space into A-Predomination, where A-Motives exceed B-Motives, and B-
Predomination, where the inverted relationship reigns.9 7
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97. Notice also that this zone of predomination says nothing about when motives are precisely
equal, though the law might nevertheless treat tied cases differently from those in which one
motive exceeds the other by a small amount.






Finally, while highly granular statements of motivational strength are prob-
ably not available, we may be able to do more than simply note whether a moti-
vation was enough (>1) on its own. In particular, we may think that among small
motives, we can conceive of motives so small as to be inconsequential or de min-
imis - even if, admittedly, still present. Thus, an introspective employer might
notice a flash of racial animus but also struggle mightily and righteously to re-
strain it, so that this bad motive was both insufficient to motivate action and very
far from that threshold indeed. So, we might sometimes distinguish between mo-
tives greater than some level, q, and those that are below that level. In such cases,











We now have four measures for a given motive, which can be used to spe-
cially define mixed motives combinations." By specifying the regions in which
a defendant is and is not liable, this framework allows the construction of many
possible motive standards.9 9 Of these, only about a dozen rules have anything to
g8. For any given motive, we can ask: Is the motive greater than q? Is it greater than 1? Is it the
largest motive? Does the sum of all motives exceed i?
99. See infra Appendix A. These are motive "standards" insofar as they specify the quanta of mo-
tives necessary for a party to prevail, just as standards of proof set the quanta of certainty
about certain elements necessary for a party to prevail. See Standard of Proof, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014) ("The degree or level of proof demanded in a specific case, such
as 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or 'by a preponderance of the evidence'; a rule about the qual-
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recommend them, and only four of them currently find widespread expression
in the law. We turn to those four widespread rules next.
B. Widespread Rules
This Section lists four widespread rules. These are the rules that will later be
shown to be most commonly used.
1. Primary Motive
Consider a legislature engaged in the redrawing of electoral districts. The
legislature violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause if it
redistricts in order to isolate racial minorities or limit their influence, but there
is no violation if the motive is instead to simply protect incumbents from chal-
lenge. 00 When both motives are present, courts ask which one predominated over
the other. Redistricting can be constitutional despite substantially racist objec-
tives if and only if other lawful motives were even more pressing.0 1
Figure 6 (Primary Motive) depicts the rule used in redistricting cases, which
we can call a Primary Motive standard. The shaded region is the space in which
the defendant will be liable, or suffer an undesired outcome, or otherwise be
regulated according to her B-Motive. The defendant's legal characterization will
depend on her primary or predominant motive. She is liable for her acts if and
only if her B-Motive is larger than her A-Motive. 102
leaves many questions unanswered, such as who must bear the burden of meeting that stand-
ard, a given motive standard likewise requires supplementation. The content of a full motive
rule or approach would allocate the burden of proof, set the level of motive required for satis-
faction, address any rules of evidence or burden shifting, and perhaps also address remedies.
This Article focuses only on motive standards.
ioo. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); accord Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996).
Racially motivated gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny, which is often regarded as
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972); cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793 (20o6) (examining the
results of strict scrutiny challenges).
io0. Vera, 517 U.S. at 959; Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
102. Note that no one is liable, on this chart, when total motivation is less than one. In that realm,
no motivated action takes place. Therefore, either there is no act to discuss, or it was unmoti-
vated (e.g., a muscle spasm). See infra Appendix A.
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The Primary Motive standard is used in several other areas, such as malicious
prosecution" and corporate law's business judgment rule.104 It is also the stand-
ard typical for tax matters, 0 5 where it is used to evaluate mixed motive gifts, 106
death benefits,10 7 bad business debt,os and business expenses."o0 In all these ar-
eas, a mixed motive defendant is given whatever legal treatment is owing to her
weightier motive; the lesser motive, regardless of whether it was itself necessary
or sufficient for action, is ultimately disregarded.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 668 & cmt. c (AM. LAw INST. 1977).
104. Directors' decisions are immunized from shareholder challenge if their motives were primarily
loyal even if they had some personal interest in the decision. See generally Alan R. Palmiter,
Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1351,
1389 n.151 (1989) (citing sources that discuss mixed motives in corporate law). Professor Jill
Fisch states that courts defer to boards if they "can attribute management's action to 'any ra-
tional business purpose."' Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Ap-
proach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32WM. &MARYL. REV. 587, 6 24-25 n.212
(1991). While this sounds like a sole purpose test, the cases Professor Fisch cites as support
for this claim actually utilize a primary purpose test. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 304 (7 th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980); see also
Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). The reason that confusion is possible is that
courts frequently say that the plaintiff prevails if the directors' improper motive was primary
or was the sole motive. E.g. Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 377 (7 th
Cir. 1984) ("Delaware's rule insulates a director's action unless plaintiff shows that an imper-
missible motive, such as perpetuation of director control, was the 'sole or primary purpose'
for the action.") (quoting Panter, 646 F.2d at 297). Yet, the "Primary Motive" test is strictly
easier for plaintiffs to satisfy than the "Sole Motive" test; any director who passes the Primary
Motive test has a legitimate motive that is more pressing that the illegitimate one. Having two
motives, the director necessarily survives the Sole Motive test. Thus, despite references to Sole
Motive, and despite the fact that courts often do find just one motive, see, e.g., Strassburger v.
Earley, 7 5 2A.2d 557, 575 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that the business judgment rule was rebut-
ted because "a repurchase of Hesperus's shares could further only one purpose - to confer ab-
solute control"), the best statement of the test is as a Primary Motive test.
105. Klein, supra note 18, at 1104; accord Blum, supra note 14, at 5o8.
io6. See Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 879 (9 th Cit. 1976) (accepting dominant motive as the
relevant legal standard). The Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein uses both the "dominant
reason" language, and "detached and disinterested generosity." 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960).
The latter might seem to imply a more restricted standard, such as a motivating factor test.
However, subsequent decisions have clearly accepted that a payment is a "gift" if the dominant
reason for it is detached and disinterested, and that this is compatible with secondary reasons
that are interested. See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 286 F.3 d 723, 729 (4 th Cit. 2002); Poyner
v. Comm'r, 301 F.2d 287, 291 (4 th Cit. 1962); Froehlinger v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 13, 17
(D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 849 (4 th Cit. 1964). Thus, the mixed motives standard here is
Primary Motive.
107. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr Co. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1343, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("While this
case, as in all the death benefit cases we have researched, contains a multiplicity of motives -
some favoring gift treatment, others favoring business treatment-we conclude that
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2. But-For Motive
As a governmental body constrained by the First Amendment, a school dis-
trict may not fire a teacher for speaking out on matters of public importance,
though clearly it may fire the teacher for making obscene gestures at students. 0
What then, when the school admittedly acts from both motives? The govern-
ment wins, despite the effort to silence political speech, as long as it was suffi-
ciently concerned about the teacher's professionalism that it would have fired
him for that reason alone. The district is only liable if silencing dissent was a but-
for motive for the firing. Many First Amendment inquiries adopt a But-For Mo-
tive standard,"' crediting the government with lawful motives unless B -Motive
changed the result. Such a standard is depicted in Figure 7 (But-For Motive).1 12
the ... dominant motive in continuing the salary and bonus payments ... was proximately
related to business.").
io8. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 104 (1972). Slight permutations on the facts of Generes
iterate endlessly, essentially always subject to a predominant, primary, or dominant motive
test. See Proximate Connection ofDebt with Taxpayer's Trade or Business, [Income] U.S. Tax Rep.
(RIA) ¶ 1665-301 (2016) (collecting cases).
iog. Section 162 allows a taxpayer to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid ... in
carrying on any trade or business'" I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012). Courts use a predominant purpose
test to determine whether deduction is available for an expense with plausibly both personal
and business motivations. See, e.g., Mohn v. United States, No. 99-CV- 7 6369, oo-CV-74575,
2001 WL 1399366, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2001) (finding that a question of fact exists in
regards to which motive predominates for repayments following a failed investment
scheme); Jenkins v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238 (T.C. 1983) (permitting deduction for re-
payments of discharged indebtedness made "with the Primary Motive of protecting his per-
sonal business reputation [as a singer/songwriter]"); cf McCann v. United States, 696 F.2d
1386, 1388 (1983) (using the Primary Purpose test to distinguish business travel from pleasure
travel).
110. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
iii. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (20o6); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 n.22 (1982) ("By 'decisive factor' we mean a 'sub-
stantial factor' in the absence of which the opposite decision would have been reached");
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (remanding to determine
whether exercise of First Amendment rights was a but-for cause, rather than "the primary"
reason); Doyle, 429 U.S. at 274.
112. The defendant is liable in Quadrant I because here the B-Motive is itself sufficient to motivate
action, and the A-Motive is not. There would have been a different (or no) action without the
B-Motive. Likewise, the hybrid cases in Quadrant IV are cases where neither the A- nor B-
Motives were independently sufficient for action, but the presence of B was enough (when
supplemented by A-Motive) to just barely motivate the action. Again, because B seems to
result in an altered state of affairs, it may be considered a but-for cause of the action. By con-
trast, Quadrant III shows too little B-Motive to independently motivate action, and the A-
Motive is strong enough to be effective without bolstering. And Quadrant II likewise shows
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The But-For Motive standard is among the law's most widespread and intu-
itive. It is used at some stage of all employment discrimination cases, as well as
in other areas.113 It is the most important standard in market manipulation when
a defendant claims to have rapidly bought stock both in order to alter stock prices
and because he wanted to own the stock as an investment. 1 14 It is likewise used
an A-Motive strong enough that conduct would have been motivated without B, even though
the B-Motive was very strong and could have motivated the action independent of any A-
Motive.
The But-For Motive standard is triggered if (B > 1 orB + A > 1) andA < 1. Since we only
observe motivated acts when B or B + A exceeds 1, the plaintiff prevails under the But-For
Motive standard any time except when A > 1.
See supra note 42.
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to evaluate anti-union activities (that nevertheless have legitimate economic mo-
tives too).11s
3. Sole Motive
The U.S. Constitution prohibits retroactive punishment,1 16 so Congress can-
not terminate social security benefits solely to heap punishment onto convicts.
However, even a small budgetary rationale will save an otherwise unconstitu-
tional law and allow termination of benefits despite the punitive shadow."' Our
ex post facto jurisprudence therefore utilizes a Sole Motive standard, in which the
defendant prevails unless their sole motive was a B-Motive. Figure 8 (Sole Mo-
tive) depicts a Sole Motive standard.
115. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert.
dismissed, 501 U.S. 1283 (1991), and cert. dismissed, 508 U.S. 948 (1993). See generally Cynthia
L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 71 TEx. L. REv. 921, 942 (1993) (describing the National Labor Relations Board's
analysis of "mixed motive" cases).
116. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring ex post facto federal laws).
117. Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987); accord Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
612-21 (1960); Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81
K1Y. L.J. 323, 353-59 (1993).
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As is plain, a Sole Motive standard is highly deferential to defendants. It is a
mixed motive standard in that it tells a court how to evaluate a mixed motives
case: always give the mixed motives case to the defendant.
Several other areas of law operate in this way: the tort of intentional inter-
ference with an economic benefit, such as setting up a business just to bankrupt
1140
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a nemesis; " racial profiling by police; "' "spite walls" and other uses of property
intended to frustrate neighbors;12 0 and the tax question of whether a transaction
is a "sham" without economic substance.121
4. Any Motive
The symmetric partner to a Sole Motive rule is an Any Motive standard. This
is the most favorable motive standard for plaintiffs since it triggers liability for
any B-Motive at all, even a very small one, alongside a much stronger A-Motive.
The Any Motive standard is depicted in Figure 9 (Any Motive). As is plainly vis-
ible, this Any Motive standard instructs the court to find for the plaintiff in all
mixed motives cases.
us. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAw OF TORTs § 625 (2d ed. 2011).
Dobbs notes that mixed motives are ubiquitous, so liability is unlikely in these cases. Id. (cit-
ing Havana Cent. NY2 LLC v. Lunney's Pub, Inc., 49 A.D. 3d 70, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(noting that a defendant did not have the required sole motive to harm the plaintiff because
there was "ample, unrefuted evidence" that the contested action was partially motivated by a
desire to gain profits)).
ig. See United States v. Avery, 137 F.3 d 343, 358 (6th Cit. 1997); William M. Carter, Jr., Whren's
Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History, and Unconscious Bias, 66 CASE WESTERN RES. L.
REv. 947, 953 (2016). A similar test is applied for probable cause of searches generally. See
Commonwealth v. Adams, 6o5 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. 1992).
120. Holbrook v. Morrison, ioo N.E. 1111, 1111 (Mass. 1913) (discussing selling property to puta-
tively undesirable owners); Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 391 (Mass. 1889) (discussing spite
walls); cf United States v. 480.oo Acres of Land, 557 F-3 d 1297, 1308-11 (11th Cit. 2009) (not-
ing that takings are judged by the "primary purpose" standard); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings
Clause, So N.C. L. REv. 713 (2002) (proposing that regulatory takings be judged by a primary
purpose standard under the Due Process Clause). But see Obolensky v. Trombley, 115 A. 3d
1016, 1023-25 (Vt. 2015) (using a primary motive test and citing five other states that adopt a
primary motive test and nine states that adopt a sole motive test).
121. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cit. 1966) (" [T]he deduction is proper if
there is some substance to the loan arrangement beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the
deduction:"). One arguable exception is Stratmore v. United States, where a taxpayer failed to
carry his burden despite a stipulation that he indeed had two motives. 42o F.2d 461, 464 (3d
Cit. 1970). In that case, the record contained no information to substantiate the relative im-
portance of the motives - such as his salary relevant to the business motive or the amount at
risk for the investment motive. Moreover, neither the government nor the court was clear
about whether "significant factor" was even the appropriate test, rather than the tougher "pri-
mary" motive test. No court has followed Stratmore on this point.
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Consider an example from health law, which allows healthcare providers to
pay commissions for some things but not others. For example, if your company
rents affordable rooms to recovering drug addicts, you may lawfully pay com-
missions to an agent for helping you find tenants. However, it is criminal to pay
someone for help in filling Medicare-subsidized drug-treatment programs.122
The notion is that such kickbacks could lead doctors to waste Medicare's money
on costlier providers and treatments. What if a single company runs both (non-
1142
122. Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a- 7b(b) (2) (A) (2012) (criminalizing pay-
ment "to induce" purchase of items or services for which Medicare or Medicaid will ultimately
make payment); see United States v. Narco Freedom, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 747 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(discussing the statute).
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Medicare) housing and (Medicare) treatment programs, with substantial over-
lap in their clientele? Then a single commission functionally serves up both res-
idents and patients, and so might come from both motives.
In such cases, health law demands purity of motive: When motives are even
slightly mixed, the whole payment is illegal.123 The unlawful payment for pa-
tients funded by Medicare dollars taints the transaction, even if lawful motives
(trying to fill rooms) predominated and would have been independently suffi-
cient to motivate the payments.12 4
III. DESCRIBING MOTIVE STANDARDS
The forgoing descriptive vocabulary accurately describes the rules, such as
they are, in numerous areas of the law. This disambiguates contested or confused
rules to determine what the law already is. It also categorizes vast amounts of
information to see how the same patterns of motive standards recur over and
over. As a result, we can clarify the present law in almost all legal domains as
using one or more of four relatively workable rules.
The structure of this Part is as follows. Section A demonstrates the power of
this descriptive vocabulary to provide a clear and entirely nonnormative state-
ment of the law in two sites of enduring contestation: equal protection and em-
ployment discrimination. Section B shows that once such clarification is accom-
plished, it becomes possible to parsimoniously summarize almost all legal
domains as using just four motive standards. Section C shows how clear motives
can streamline mixed motives analysis, allowing courts to use it more often and
effectively than before, rather than avoid it.
A. Clarifying Existing Legal Standards: Two Challenging Contexts
Careful use of a precise motivation vocabulary should help courts and com-
mentators to address problematic application of motive standards. Consider
how this vocabulary can untangle confusing or confused motive standards in the
equal protection and employment discrimination contexts.
123. Narco Freedom, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 759; see also United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3 d 774, 782 (7 th
Cir. 2011) (compiling cases and adopting the any factor test).
124. This is the test that I will later argue covers the plaintiff's initial burden in core Title VII em-
ployment discrimination cases. See infra Section III.A.2.
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1. Equal Protection
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."125 It is therefore unconstitutional to use race as a
basis for abridging a variety of civil rights.
The operation of mixed motives under the Fourteenth Amendment has
sometimes been unclear. Consider Hunter v. Underwood, in which the State of
Alabama sought to defend a state constitutional provision disenfranchising per-
sons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. 12 6 The law was seemingly born of
mixed motives, some unconstitutional (to disenfranchise black citizens), and
some lawful, if distasteful (to disenfranchise poor citizens, including many
whites).
In adopting a mixed motives rule, the Court agreed that Arlington Heights
and Mt. Healthy "supply the proper analysis."127 Under those cases, the state pre-
vails if it proves "that the same decision would have resulted had the impermis-
sible purpose not been considered."12 8 This is a But-For Motive standard by our
terminology, and the Hunter Court actually refers to its standard as a "but-for"
standard.129 The Court reasoned that something can be a "but-for" motivation
despite the existence of some alternative basis for action, and that the mixed mo-
tives in Hunter fit the bill. As the Court stated, "an additional purpose to dis-
criminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to dis-
criminate against all blacks, and it is beyond peradventure that the latter was a
'but-for' motivation for the enactment of [the provision]." `0
While superficially plausible, this passage either misapplies the motive
standard or miscommunicates the motive analysis (as well as the procedural pos-
ture of the case). Both readings are plausible, and the following paragraphs con-
sider both. Either way, Hunter is instructive of the ways in which clarity about
motive analysis could have been useful.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
126. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
127. Id. at 232.
128. Id. at 225 (quoting Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984)) (citing Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 & n.21 (1977) and Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
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Since the Court does not qualify its invocation of "an additional purpose to
discriminate," one way to read the passage is as categorically denying that hos-
tility to poor whites could have changed the legal result. That is, given what the
Court has learned about anti-black motives, its holding is inevitable. Additional
purposes, regardless of their relative or absolute strength, cannot render the il-
licit one nugatory.
If this is what the Court meant, it is plainly wrong and inconsistent with the
But-For Motive standard elaborated in Section II.B, which excuses liability if A-
Motive is high enough."' That is, the essence of a But-For standard is that an
additional good motive can often render lawful an otherwise ill-purposed act. To
see this, consider Figure lo (Rendering Nugatory).
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131. Its analysis would also clash with the application of the But-For standard in Arlington Heights
and Mt. Healthy, the cases cited approvingly as the source of the standard. Moreover, it would
clash with the analogous meaning of but-for causation in tort (which denies that X is a but-
for cause, if Y would have led to the same result even if X were subtracted).







On this reading, the Hunter Court ruled that it would not have mattered
whether Alabama had a countervailing, acceptable motive, which is to say that
the Court denied the legal relevance of the Y-axis. Yet the Y-axis makes all the
difference on a But-For standard. A defendant with a single B-Motive (with
strength Di) is liable, but the defendant escapes liability if his A-Motive is high
enough (to, for example, D2). So if the Court meant what it said, it misapplied
its motive standard.
Another reading is that the Court's mistake was merely a failure to qualify its
language: instead of writing "an additional purpose" it should have written "an
additional, individually insufficient purpose." If that were the Court's idea, then
there is no misunderstanding of motive rules: given that "it is beyond peradven-
ture that" racism "was a 'but-for' motivation for the enactment," it is true that
an additional, individually insufficient A-Motive could not save Alabama.
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However, this reading understands the Court as question-begging by as-
suming the very thing to be proven-that the discriminatory motive was a but-
for cause. One cannot derive the insufficiency of A-Motive from observing that
B-Motive was essential, since one cannot know if B-Motive was essential apart
from a measure of A-Motive. The very question is whether A-Motive is large
enough to move the defendant from Quadrants I or IV up into II or III.132 If it
was, then the B-Motive is not a But-For Motive. The status of B-Motive, as a
But-For Motive or not, is a function of A-Motive. In fact, the only way to con-
clude that A-Motive is insufficient and B-Motive is a but-for motivation is to
check: to engage in factfinding about the actual motives and how they played out.
Yet this factfinding never happened in Hunter. The trial court had not con-
ducted a full hearing on the crucial issue of the strength of Alabama's motivation
to discriminate against poor whites, presumably because it did not understand
that the applicable law would require this.' With no clear finding on the mag-
nitude of A-Motive, it is not possible to deduce whether B-Motive satisfied a
But-For Motive standard.
Given the procedural posture, the right response is to remand for factfinding
to determine whether A-Motive was independently sufficient or insufficient and
thus whether B-Motive was a but-for motivation or not. In other mixed motives
cases like this, where the trial court did not make this crucial determination, the
Court has indeed remanded for further consideration.134
In Hunter, however, the Court decided the case without remand, outright
affirming the Court of Appeals's injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. This may
have been because the Court ignored the procedural posture and communicated
using ambiguous motive terminology. Or it may be because the Court misun-
derstood the operation of various motive standards and applied some other test
(perhaps the Primary Motive or Any Motive standard) under the wrong name.
The Court either was confused or propagated confusion. With the benefit of
clear terminology, we can chart the possibilities and perhaps help courts avert
trouble in the future.
132. See infra Section III.C.
133. Underwood, 730 F.2d at 617 ("By allowing the state to prevail on what the district court con-
cluded was a showing of permissible intent, the court brought its inquiry to a premature
end.").
134. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979) (remanding to
determine whether the exercise of First Amendment rights was a but-for cause of termination,
even though the trial court had determined that this was "the primary" reason for termina-
tion, and even though the Court of Appeals had held that the defendant had failed to make a
successful "same decision anyway" defense).
1147
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In that light, clear terms could probably have helped the Hunter advocates
make their cases. Alabama's attorneys did themselves no service by bungling
their own presentation of the requisite motive standard.' Alabama asked for a
prodefendant But-For Motive, arguing that "a permissible purpose will always
defeat an impermissible motive.1 3 6 But they did not name the desired standard
or use words such as "but-for."
More confusingly, Alabama's arguments frequently assumed the applicability
of altogether different motive standards. For example, its brief repeatedly argues
for "the existence of a [lawful] motive, at least equal if not superior to any other
motive.""' Arguing that the supreme motive was lawful might help if the legal
standard were a Primary Motive standard, but it is irrelevant to a But-For Motive
standard: A-Motive can be larger than B-Motive (satisfying a Primary Motive
standard) even if B-Motive is a but-for factor of the action. This occurs in do-
main IVA. Likewise, A-Motive can be smaller than B-Motive even if B-Motive is
not a but-for factor in the action (domain IB). Figure 11 (Orthogonal Alabama)
shows just how orthogonal Alabama's arguments were to their desired But-For
Motive standard.
135. It is also possible that the problems I identify were rhetorical choices, carefully chosen to
nudge the Court regardless of the motive standard. In that case, terminological clarification
would not have changed counsel's word choice.
136. Brief for Appellants at 19, Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (No. 84-76). This state-
ment could also be read as a Sole Motive standard.
137. Id. at 20-21; see also id. at 32 (arguing that the court below "did not consider the possibility of
the existence of an intention equal to the one they found to be impermissible").
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But-For Motive Test but loses
under Prim Motive test
Motti test but ins under
But-For Motivc test
B-Motvc
Alabama's equivocation on the content of its preferred standard may explain
why the Court endorsed the standard but still applied it to Alabama's detriment.
It behooves advocates to present their arguments consistently with sensible mo-
tives analysis, if only to increase the chance that courts will respond accordingly.
Clear motives terminology gives us a succinct way to diagnose or prevent
problematic holdings. This is true in troublesome cases like Hunter, where the
Court and litigants alike were at a loss for the right words, but it is also true in
subtler cases that have not even been noticed as misunderstood.
Consider another equal protection context: Batson challenges to biased jury
selection. In Cook v. LaMarque, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals laid out a
"substantial part" standard for Batson challenges, looking at whether peremptory
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strikes were motivated in "substantial part" by race.' This is thought to be a
different approach from the Any Motive standard most states use and the But-
For standard most federal circuits use."' In what ways is this standard different
from the other two? We can conjecture about the meaning of the rule based on
the name -perhaps it is a Sole Motive standard that exempts "insubstantial"
motives as immaterial. 140 But the operation of the standard gives better clues as
to its actual content.
Trial courts applying Cook make extensive examinations of the good and bad
motives behind prosecutors' preemptory challenges and ultimately decide
whether a challenge was unconstitutional by weighing their relative im-
portance.14 1 The stronger motive controls. The use of both Motives A and B, as
well as their comparative weighing, is characteristic of the Primary Motive stand-
ard but not of the other widespread standards.142 The courts' descriptive vocab-
ulary reveals that the Ninth Circuit's "substantial factor" standard is really a Pri-
mary Motive standard akin to the one used in defamation, redistricting, and
taxation of gifts.
With the Primary Motive standard in mind, it is easy to find confirmation
that this is the test intended by the Court of Appeals in Cook. The court asked
whether the prosecutor's "primary motivation was race."143 It found that the pros-
ecutor's "most significant justifications in each instance [where a juror was struck]
were entirely sound." 4 4 This emphasis on comparative importance, a search for
what is primary, points toward a Primary Motive standard. Notwithstanding its
idiosyncratic nomenclature, the content of the Ninth Circuit's "substantial fac-
tor" test is clearly understandable as one of the four widespread tests.
138. Cookv. LaMarque, 593 F.3 d Si, 815 ( 9 th Cir. 2010).
139. State v. Ornelas, 330 P.3d io85, 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (" [M]ost states have adopted what
is ... referred to as the per se approach, some states and most federal circuits have adopted a
mixed-motives analysis, and the Ninth Circuit has adopted its own approach.").
140. See infra Figure 12 (depicting this "Material Motive" test).
141. E.g., Crittenden v. Calderon, Nos. CIV S-95-1957 KJM GGH P, CIV S-97-o6o2 KJM GGH
P, 2011 WL 2619097, at *26 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011).
142. See infra Section III.C.
143. Cook, 593 F.3d at 821 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
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2. Employment Discrimination
Like equal protection law, employment discrimination cases often turn on
mixed motives analysis, though the legal standard is far from clear. A "motivat-
ing factor" will suffice to prove discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, but what does that term mean? The word "motivating" could connote
some minimum level of motivational strength. Or maybe it merely distinguishes
motivations (i.e. factors that motivate) from other, nonactionable mental states
such as "mere discriminatory thoughts."4 5 The former view would grant em-
ployers a safe harbor for tiny slivers of discriminatory motive, while the latter
would let employees prevail even if an illicit motive was causally inconsequential.
"What constitutes a substantial motivating factor evades precise defini-
tion."1 4 6 The answer is not found in any statute.147 Nor have courts supplied a
clear and authoritative definition, despite almost ten thousand federal opinions
using the term.148 Scholars have debated the meaning of "motivating factor" and
145. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (re-
jecting the "mere discriminatory thoughts" standard). For more support of this view, see id.
at 250 (majority opinion) ("In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its rea-
sons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the ap-
plicant or employee was a woman."). See generally Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Dis-
crimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REv. 279, 298-302 (2010)
(reviewing Justices' memoranda and notes to show Justice Brennan's desire to accommodate
Justice O'Connor's concerns while avoiding a connotation that "the discrimination must be of
a certain magnitude before the burden must shift").
146. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3 d 1182, 1188 (ioth Cir. 2005).
147. See Rebeca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination
in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 505 n.66 (2001) ("Left to be
determined ... is what is meant by 'a motivating factor."). The "motivating factor" formula-
tion adopted in the statute was only one of over twenty different formulations offered up by
the plurality and concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse. See Katz, supra note 4, at 491-92 n.5
(listing the various formulations).
148. Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31, 39 (ist Cit. 1998) (reviewing a judge's reply to
a jury's request of a definition for "a motivating factor" and noting "the controversy that ex-
ists" over the definition); Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant's Jury In-
structions, Brown v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1o 7 CVoolo 5 , 2008 WL 7254694, at *4 (D. Me.
Aug. 22, 2008) (arguing that "the proposed jury verdict form they have submitted is legally
incorrect in that it . .. states that the Plaintiffs only have to show that discrimination was 'a
factor' when the mixed motive law clearly requires that they establish that it was a 'motivating
factor"').
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its progenitors for decades,14 9 leading one commentator to conclude that "a con-
sistent and nonproblematic interpretation of 'motivating factor' cannot be
given."`0 This Article's descriptive vocabulary can help to clarify the standard.
There are at least four candidate standards for this legal standard-the Any
Motive standard depicted in Figure 9 and three competitors, which are not wide-
spread: (i) Material Motive;1 s' (ii) Sufficient Motive;152 (iii) Causal Motive.ss
We are already familiar with the Any Motive standard, which finds for the plain-
tiff if the defendant had any B-Motive, so let us now introduce the other three
candidate standards in order to see how they operate. While each standard has
at least superficial appeal, it is ultimately clear that the Any Motive standard sup-
plies a rule most consistent with the "motivating factor" standard. The stakes of
this determination are high: the three competitor standards are each tougher
than the Any Motive standard, potentially leaving some plaintiffs out in the cold.
i. Material Motive
It may seem that illicit factors can be present but sufficiently tiny such that
they do not trigger liability. Sometimes a boss was motivated by the employee's
race to fire her but was very far from acting on the impulse - until he discovered
problematic information about the employee's job performance. Should such a
boss lose a lawsuit for her largely immaterial bias? Figure 12 (Material Motive)
awards victory under a Material Motive standard to the plaintiff whenever mixed
motive action occurs, except in domains IIIAb or IVAb. Recall that q, demarcating
these two areas, represents the level below which a motive's strength is regarded
as too "tiny" to trigger liability.154
149. See, e.g., Michael Wells, ThreeArguments Against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory, Constitutional Torts,
and Freedom of Speech, 51 MERCERL. REV. 583, 588-89 (2000); Heather K. Gerken, Note, Un-
derstanding Mixed Motives Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of Intentional
Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1824
(1993).
150. Gudel, supra note 21, at 70.
151. See infra Figure 12 and accompanying text.
152. See infra Figure 13 and accompanying text.
153. See infra Figure 14 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
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If the strength of B-Motive is the crux of legal treatment, then it may make
sense to single out all and only the cases where B>1. The B-Motive is legally
controlling if it was sufficient to independently motivate action, considered apart
from what A-Motive did or did not contribute. Thus, another candidate rule is a
Sufficient Motive standard.' This rule, depicted in Figure 13 (Sufficient Motive),
155. At times, Mark Weber advocates for something like a Sufficient Motive standard. Cf. Weber,
supra note 23, at 499 (defining mixed motives cases as those where "two causes, either of
which would alone cause the harm, operate simultaneously"); id. at 495 (advocating plaintiff
victory in all mixed motives cases).
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would cover quadrants I and 11. It tolerates employer bias except when the bias
was strong enough to lead to a firing -and then there is no defense that some
other legitimate factors could have led to the same firing.
FIGURE 13.
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It may sometimes seem to matter whether a motivation had any causal im-
pact. It is clear that the But-For Motive standard is meant to reflect some causal
considerations. The nature of causation is contested, but one approach would
take the Restatement (Third) of Torts as a guide. 116 Finding for the defendant only
156. See R-ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Topus: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HAPM §§ 26, 27
(Am. LAwINST. 2010); see also infra note 158 (discussing causation in tort law).
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in Quadrant III leaves us with the Causal Motive standard. Under such a rule, the
plaintiff wins if B-Motive was either a sufficient factor or a but-for factor, as de-







These four rules differ greatly in their solicitude to plaintiffs. Which, if any,
is the right match for the "motivating factor" standard, which entitles Title VII
discrimination plaintiffs to at least a partial remedy? Part II's motive vocabulary
helps answer this question.
Two of these candidate standards - Material Motive and Sufficient Motive -
can be ruled out as leading to illogical results, inconsistent with the intellectual
1155
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foundations of the motivating factor standard. The locus of the problem is area







IVAb covers cases where no one motive is sufficient to motivate action indi-
vidually, and where a very tiny B-Motive is necessary to complete an almost suf-
ficient A-Motive. For example, a boss may almost fire an employee for dangerous
job performance, but only resolve to do so after giving credence to a lingering
animosity toward the employee's national origin.
The Material Motive and Sufficient Motive standards each exclude IVAb from
liability. This exclusion is a defect for two separate reasons.
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First, tort law regards all but-for causes as causes-in-fact." There is no ex-
emption in tort law for small cause; the straw that breaks the camel's back is a
cause even if the straw is awfully light."' In IVAb, B-Motive is tiny but it is nev-
ertheless a but-for cause of the action. Insofar as tort serves as the intellectual
foundation of employment law motives analysis, the exclusion of IVAb would be
surprising indeed. 160
Second, excluding IVAb from liability yields an anomaly in the mixed motive
burden shifting in Civil Rights Act employment discrimination. There, the
plaintiff wins if they establish a "motivating factor," and wins full remedies if the
defendant cannot then show that the same result would occur either way under
a But-For Motive standard. It is universally accepted that motivating factor is an
easier standard than the same result-test or but-for test.161 Yet under a Material
Motive or Sufficient Motive standard, IVAb flunks the "easy" motivating factor
standard while passing the "hard" but-for test. This anomaly clashes with most
jurisprudence and scholarship on the subject.16 2
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs, supra note 156, at § 26. Language in the First and Second
Restatements might have allowed exclusion of tiny but-for causes from causal characteriza-
tion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs: WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGAL CAUSE § 431 cmt. a
(AM. LAw. INST. 1965) ("[I]t is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the
actor not been negligent .... The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing
about the plaintiff's harm."). That formulation was criticized for muddling the factual ques-
tion of causation (causation-in-fact) from the evaluative question of responsibility (proximate
causation). Restatement (Third) clarifies that small but-for causes are causes-in-fact. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTs, supra note 156, at § 26 cmt. j (eliminating discretion for the fact
finder to find no factual causation on grounds that putative cause was not sufficiently sub-
stantial); id. at § 27 cmt. b (eliminating discretion in the same manner for multiple causes).
To the degree that small causes deserve special treatment, it is at another state of adjudication
that is concerned with responsibility. While the Restatement preserves the possibility that an
actor should be exempt from liability where their contribution was "only a trivial contribu-
tion," that exemption does not arise by way of a causation analysis. Id. at § 36 cmt. b ("The
limitation on the scope of liability provided in this Section is not applicable if the trivial con-
tributing cause is necessary for the outcome. . . .'). The actor (and his conduct) remain a
cause. The exemption is effected by way of a scope of liability analysis. Id.
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs, supra note 156, at § 36 cmt. b (" [T] he actor who negligently
provides the straw that breaks the camel's back is subject to liability for the broken back.").
16o. The Sufficient Factor test goes even further afield, finding for the defendant in the entire IV
quadrant.
161. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 4, at 503.
162. See, e.g., id. at 492 n.1o. It also clashes with the legislative history. The 1991 Amendment was
intended to make life easier for plaintiffs, which is certainly how the law has been understood
by subsequent treatment. Plaintiffs' lawyers have lamented the shrinking coverage of Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendment. Yet a plaintiff with good evidence that the defendant's
motive was within IVAb would do better if forced to carry the whole burden of proving but-
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As between the remaining options, Causal Motive and Any Motive, one
stands on securer footing in terms of the case law insofar as courts never seem to
actually use a Causal Motive standard. 1 63 That is, I cannot find any employment
law case in any domain in which (1) the defendant wins, (2) B-Motive was pre-
sent, and (3) the court rejects the Sole Motive, Primary Motive, and But-For
Motive standards. If a court purports to engage in some kind of "some motive"
analysis (whether it be "motivating factor" or "substantial factor" or something
else), and if it does not immediately clarify that the standard will actually be one
of the other standards, the defendant always loses once a B-Motive is proven. 164
for causation of the same result, rather than accept the supposedly solicitous motivating factor
test.
163. Both stand on secure footing with respect to tort principles. The two rules differ only as to
Quadrant III, a region where the Restatement is agnostic. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,
supra note 156, at § 27 cmt. f ("Sometimes, one actor's contribution may be sufficient to bring
about the harm while another actor's contribution is only sufficient when combined with
some portion of the first actor's contribution. Whether the second actor's contribution can be
so combined into a sufficient causal set is a matter on which this Restatement takes no position
and leaves to future development in the courts."); cf. id. at cmt. i (noting " [t] he difficulty with
dismissing" the "de minimis causal candidates and others that are overwhelmed by an inde-
pendently sufficient cause . . . as not causally connected to the plaintiff's harm"). Influential
tort scholars have advocated for liability in that context. E.g., Richard W. Wright, Causation
in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1735, 1794 (1985); see also Weber, supra note 23, at 517 ("The vast
majority of legal sources rely on philosophers' arguments to conclude that any causal factor
that contributes to a harmful decision is a cause-in-fact of the full harm."). Recall that in
Quadrant III, A-Motive is sufficient on its own to motivate action and B-Motive is neither
independently sufficient nor is it necessary, given the strength of the A-Motive. It is not tempt-
ing to regard the B-Motive as a cause; it is like the match that is tossed onto a blazing inferno.
And yet, the Restatement approach does not rule it out.
The argument is that small causes, though dwarfed by a larger cause, do still have a causal
impact. They assure the outcome against some set of background facts, namely a partial slice
of the presently robust alternative cause. They are therefore necessary elements of a sufficient
set, which according to scholars such as Richard Wright, is what we mean by "cause." The tiny
match is a necessary member of a causally sufficient set: the portion of the inferno that was not
quite big enough to destroy the house is made big enough by the match. Likewise, the portion
of the A-Motive that was not sufficient to motivate the action can be thought to sum with the
B-Motive. Finding causation in Quadrant III in the analogous mixed motives case would lead
to an Any Motive test.
Whether this is a sound conclusion, whether fires and motives can be sub-divided, is
plainly controversial, which is why the Restatement noted the possibility and neither endorsed
nor rejected it.
164. See, e.g., Kell v. AutoZone, Inc., No. o7ASo43 7 5 , 2014 WL 509143, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
10, 2014, as modified Feb. 24, 2014) (affirming a verdict in favor of the plaintiff based on the
harmless error of the jury instruction requiring a "motivating factor," rather than the "height-
ened standard of causation, requiring the plaintiff. . . to prove that the illegal criterion was 'a
substantial motivating factor"').
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There simply is no case that lies in Quadrant III in which the defendant wins
except under a But-For, Primary, or Sole Motive standard. Thus, "motivating
factor" means Any Motive.165
Numerous areas of law use terminology reminiscent of "motivating factor."
For example, state courts interpreting federal whistleblower statutes sometimes
refer to "contributing" factors and other times to "substantial" factors. Are these
also Any Motive standards akin to the motivating factor standard, or do they
represent subtly different standards? Given the diversity of rules, and given our
present goal of fashioning an articulate descriptive vocabulary of motives, it may
seem impossible to group many rules under a single heading.
Nevertheless, the grouping is appropriate. As with employment discrimina-
tion, the anomalous treatment of IVAb argues against understanding these stand-
ards as requiring any minimum quantum. And a careful and ongoing search of
cases has not yet presented one in which the standard was clearly a Causal Motive
standard as opposed to an Any Motive standard.166
Equal protection and employment discrimination cases frequently involve
mixed motives. Whether the plaintiff has allegedly been excluded from the ballot
box, the jury box, or the workplace, courts often tangle the multiplicity of
vaguely worded tests. Consistency and clarity can be improved even in these
challenging domains if advocates and jurists improve their precision in describ-
ing and evaluating motives.
B. There Are Only Four Widespread Standards
Employment discrimination uses an Any Motive standard for some inquiries
and a But-For Motive standard for others. Tax uses a Primary Motive standard
for most determinations and a Sole Motive standard for the rest. Thus there are
165. Cf. Weber, supra note 23, at 495 (advocating for full recovery in all mixed motives employment
cases).
166. Nor are courts systematic in preserving the linguistic illusion that they are using something
other than an Any Motive test. For example, in Singh v. Gonzales, the test requires that the
defendant "was motivated, at least in part, by one of the protected characteristics." 4o6 F.3d
191, 197 (3d Cir. 2005). The court then cites three other cases for support of this rule: one
requires that the action was "motivated in significant part" and the other two use an Any Mo-
tive test. Id. at 198. The word "significant" loses any meaning in its precedential application.
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four standards used in those two domains. 167 Perhaps surprisingly, these are the
only four standards in widespread use. Appendix B demonstrates this claim. 168
The parsimony is partially explained by the identity between the Any Motive
standard and numerous similarly worded standards. 169 Other identities further
thin the field. Using the descriptive tools from Part II, we can now see clearly
what it would require for courts to use a rule other than the widespread four. It
would require shading a different shape in the motivational space than any of
these four standards. Although this is conceptually possible, it is rarely at-
tempted. 170 Some rules that appear to differ from these four widespread rules
are actually identical to them, because they shade the same domains of liability.
The motive standards state the conditions for liability in terms of B-Motive
or B-Motive and A-Motive. An Any Motive standard conditions liability on a
quantum of B-Motive. But we can think of rules that focus on A-Motive and
describe conditions for forgiveness. Doing so allows us to observe various sorts
of symmetry.
A Sole Motive standard for liability and an Any Motive standard for for-
giveness are complements. A Sole Motive standard convicts on a mere hint of B-
Motive. This is akin to an Any Motive standard keyed to exonerate based on A-
Motive: under either standard, a whiff of A-Motive exonerates. Symmetrically,
an Any Motive standard (conditioning liability on B-Motive) convicts at a mere
hint of B-Motive. This is akin to a Sole Motive standard keyed to A-Motive. Ei-
ther standard exonerates only the pure of heart.
The But-For Motive standard is triggered if (B > 1 or B + A > 1) and A < 1.
Since we only observe motivated acts when B or B + A exceeds 1, the But-For
Motive standard convicts any time except when A > 1. And that means the stand-
ard could be rephrased as an "A-Motive Sufficiency" standard: the defendant is
exonerated whenever A-Motive was independently sufficient for action.1 7 1
167. Even more parsimony could be claimed. Sole Motive is itself a subset of But-For and Primary
Motive. Any time a motive is solitary, it will also be a necessary motive and larger than any
other motives.
168. Note that many areas of law use more than one test, due to circuit splits or differing rules from
state to state.
169. See supra Section III.A.2.
170. For an example, consider the law on civilian unauthorized recordings. There, the defendant
loses if her unlawful motive (e.g., blackmail) is either a But-For or Primary Motive. United
States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, it would inculpate in Quadrants
I, I1B, and IV.
171. This does not always seem to have impressed itself on even very able scholars. Bill Klein urges
allowing tax deductions for putative business expenditures if the business aspect was a "suf-
ficient" motive. Klein, supra note 18, at 1111. That is, he would give A-Treatment if A>1. That
116o
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An inculpating Primary Motive standard as to B-Motive is identical to an
exonerating Primary Motive standard as to A.
TABLE 1.
COMPLEMENT TEST
Liable if (and only if) Not liable if (and only if)
Sole Motive (B) Any Motive (A)
Any Motive (B) Sole Motive (A)
But-For (plaintiff loses unless B was a Sufficiency (A) (plaintiff loses if A
but-for cause) was sufficient)
Sufficiency (B) (plaintiff loses unless But-For (A) (plaintiff loses if A was
B>1) a but-for cause)
Primary (B) Primary (A)
Once complement rules are associated, the universe of salient rules narrows
considerably. The result is the observation that courts actually use only these four
widespread standards.
C. Practicable Motive Analysis
Courts are often reluctant to use motives analysis. Motives can be concealed
or fabricated, sometimes leading to lengthy trials or potentially inaccurate con-
clusions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to argue whether motive analysis
is ultimately worth the candle in any given case.
Yet motives inquiries are easier to administer than commonly believed. Most
motive standards do not require the factfinder to excavate and weigh all motives,
nor to predict counterfactual results if one motive or the other were subtracted.
That is because most motive standards focus on only one motive as directly rel-
evant. The ability to focus the inquiry on a single motive streamlines hearings
and simplifies jury instructions.
There is only one standard that requires a court to evaluate the strength of
both A- and B-Motives: the Primary Motive standard. With this standard, the
is identical to giving B-Treatment if B (non-business reasons, like vacations) was a but-for
cause of the trip. Klein might have realized he was advocating for a but-for test, but one ima-
gines he would have made that understanding more transparent, given that but-for tests are
so thoroughly disliked by tax scholars -including Klein himself. See id. at 1112 (explaining the
problems with a but-for test).
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court must appraise both motives in order to compare their relative contribu-
tions. All other standards allow the court to resolve the legal question by refer-
ence to only one motive.
An Any Motive standard asks only for the presence of any B-Motive. If it is
found, then the defendant loses. A Sole Motive standard exonerates the defend-
ant upon a showing of any A-Motive. A But-For Motive standard can be imple-
mented solely by testing whether the A-Motive was sufficient (>1) to motivate
action. If it was, then the B -Motive was not a but-for cause. If the A-Motive was
not sufficient, then- given that we observe action- the B-Motive can be inferred








For example, if a government actor such as a school district terminates some-
one for potentially legitimate (e.g. job performance) and illegitimate (e.g. exer-
cising First Amendment rights) reasons, the relevant but-for standard calls for
only consideration of the A motive. Since the parties are sparring over the plau-
sibility of the A-Motive, the court can exclude almost all testimony about B-Mo-
tive. Lengthy testimony about the school's many reasons to censor can be ex-
cluded so that the jurors can focus on just the single inquiry: did the defendant
have a non-pretextual and sufficient legitimate motive for action? Likewise,
when a plaintiff challenges a law as ex post facto punishment, fact-finding can
be limited solely to the presence or absence of a legitimate (A) reason for action:
172. Professor Stephen Gottlieb identifies four ways that courts establish motives: rational basis
(no other motive exists); strict scrutiny (no other sufficient motive exists, given alternatives);
natural and probable consequence (the result was probably the goal); and confession. See
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Commentary: Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 97, 102-03 (1986). The first two are attempts to locate B-Motive
and assess the legal result solely by probing the strength and plausibility of A-Motive.
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the legislative record need not be searched at length for lurking punitive reasons
for the law.
Of course, there may be times where the best way to investigate the legally
relevant motive is by discussing the presence or absence of the other motive."'
Yet, this is certainly not all cases. Moreover, in many of these cases, recourse to
one motive is legally relevant because we have essentially no reliable access to the
other motive. For example, when individuals request asylum in the United
States, the motives of their persecutors are legally relevant, but evidence may be
scant. The persecutor is unlikely to testify or explain their conduct. In these
cases, it is natural that the inquiry will focus on the persecutor's alleged B-Mo-
tives, as established by whatever evidence the asylum seeker can muster, because
there will be no evidence of other motives. In evidence-constrained instances, we
still have only a single motive to evaluate.
Recognizing that many motive inquiries concern only one motive allows
courts to cabin the cost and length of mixed motive inquiries by permitting only
evidence directly or indirectly probative of the relevant motive. For example, im-
agine a suit alleging discrimination on the basis of military status, in which the
employer that concedes that anti-military bias was a motivating factor in termi-
nating an employee. Suits for anti-military bias are judged by a But-For stand-
ard,174 which therefore turns only on A-Motive. This legal standard can bracket
potentially lengthy testimony and argumentation: the parties may want to spar
over the prevalence of B-Motive - the plaintiff in particular may like to regale the
jury with humiliating incidents and incriminating emails, which the defendant
will try to minimize-yet the case no longer turns on B-Motive. Instead, all that
matters is the credibility and intensity of the A-Motive. The defendant must try
to show that it had a legitimate motive sufficient for action, and the plaintiff
must try to discredit it. Nothing more need be allowed.
It may seem improper that an employee subjected to a particularly egregious
bias incident, accompanied by copious evidence of overwhelming B-Motive,
should be prevented from airing it. For those concerned that this motive stand-
ard has excessively limited the evidence and arguments, or will tend to constrain
173. For example, it may be that the best way to decide whether an A-Motive would have motivated
an action is to look at the defendant's overwhelming and protracted commitment to B-Mo-
tives. Perhaps this is based on an empirical theory of motivation correlation, such that indi-
viduals almost never have high A and B motivations. Thus, a But-For test may sometimes
involve recourse to B - and not just A-Motives.
174. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2012).
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plaintiffs more than defendants, a plausible inference is that the law has opted
for a poor motive standard."'
Still, inquiry limits arising from motive rules may prove attractive in contexts
where procedural constraints already threaten workable motive analyses any-
way. 176 For example, Batson challenges are often concluded quickly, without any
lengthy fact-finding. There are limits to what can be achieved in such a context.
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, courts handle these claims using either a But-For
test or an Any Motive standard, which turn on only one motive. Those hearings
can proceed expeditiously, without lengthy inquiries into a defendant's irrelevant
motive, and courts can limit testimony only to the legally relevant motive
(whether it be A or B). 1 7 7
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit wished to capture these efficiencies, and the Pri-
mary Motive standard now implemented by lower courts represents an undesir-
able slippage from the initial formulation -the fruit of unclear terminology. Or
possibly the Court of Appeals would have clearly stated that it prefers the Pri-
mary Motive standard, with all of its back and forth, if it had been aware of that
term and option. Either way, the Ninth Circuit may be well served by translating
its test into terms consistent with this Article's. A complete understanding of the
motive rules and what they entail should allow courts to adopt what they deem
to be most practicable or to endorse some other test despite the cost.
CONCLUSION
The law often avoids consideration of motives, and this impulse is even
stronger when motives are mixed. We doubt the power of juries to find mental
"facts," and we distrust our own motives -paternalism, censorship, thought po-
licing-for demanding that they try. As a result, courts disavow the legal rele-
vance of the motives or construe facts to find only simple motives that fit simple
175. Indeed, I argue as such in other work. See Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed Motives (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author).
176. These challenges are not handled through full trials. See Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3 d 810, 828
( 9 th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting sparse record); accord Covey, supra note 19,
at 323; Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH L.
REv. 2229, 2302-03 n.238 (1995). Many motives inquiries are likewise handled without a full
hearing. See, e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1299 (9 th Cir. 1984) (denying
plaintiffs' request to depose city officials as to their motives, even though their motives would
control the constitutionality of a zoning decision).
177. Cf. Herman A. Moore Tr. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 430 (1968) (Tannenwald, J., concurring) (criti-
cizing the Primary Motive standard in a tax case because of litigation expenses).
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rules. And when courts do craft mixed motive standards, they may incline to-
ward standards that seem familiar, or they may have great difficulty in communi-
cating what approach they have taken.
It is hard to be thoughtful about a practice that we are uncomfortable admit-
ting we engage in at all. Yet motives are part of human life, and they are part of
the law. Judges psychoanalyze, identifying one motive as primary or real and the
rest as incidental or pretextual; they play scientist, exploring the causal impact
of particular fragments of motivation; and they interpret, investing actions with
significance in light of their animating purposes. If courts must assess motives,
in all their complexity, we must be prepared to offer articulate descriptions and
evaluations of them. This Article attempts to lift motives from ulteriority into a
place where they can be discussed. It introduces a system for describing mixed
motives, useful both for considering candidate rules for a given domain and de-
coding existing motive standards.
With a wide menu of options discovered, courts or legislatures must choose
among them according to the normative status of each rule: the agendas they
advance and whether those agendas are normatively acceptable. Accordingly, the
next logical step is to set out a thoroughgoing, evaluative framework capable of
determining which motive standard is most appropriate in a given dispute.
To set out a normative structure for mixed motive standards, we would need
to know what drives our use of motives at all - since, presumably, the proper way
to use motives must be a function of what we are using them for and, presuma-
bly, we aren't using motives for the same reasons in every case. Therefore, prior
to a normative analysis, we would need to complete a taxonomy of justificatory
rationales, canvassing the various reasons that the law might invoke motives ra-
ther than leave motives out of the inquiry. This taxonomy would itself prompt
meta-normative questions: among the many reasons for which the law invokes
motives (and from which mixed motive standards might follow), which are ap-
propriate reasons and which are not?
These various normative questions follow naturally from the descriptive pro-
ject of this Article. Accordingly, the next logical step in developing a jurispru-
dence of mixed motives is a complete normative treatment of mixed motives in
the law.
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APPENDIX A: FULL MOTIVE ARTICULATION
The four motive measures in Section II.A can be used to identify ten distinct
motive regions. Figure 16 (Complete Map) depicts these combinations by over-
laying our four motive measures, simplifying only the lower left hand corner.1 78











178. This project concerns liability for certain motivated acts. It is worth noting that the law could
target non-acts or acts conducted without sufficient motivation. The former we call "thought
crimes" and the latter we may call strict liability or, perhaps, negligence. Yet there is no need
in a project about mixed motivation to inquire deeply into what sorts of persons deserve sanc-
tions despite having intended nothing or done nothing.
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Although replete with visual content, this figure displays only the same in-
formation as before. Quadrant I represents cases of sole-determination by B,
though it can be subdivided into cases where A is tiny (IBa) and the remaining
cases (IBA) (notice the lower case "a" for the tiny case). The same division is pos-
sible for the other sole-determined case in Quadrant III. Quadrant II represents
overdetermined cases in which both A andB were sufficiently strong motivations
for action. Here "IIA" denotes that A predominates over a weaker (if still suffi-
cient) B-Motive.
IV.n, reminds us of a zone where the sum of all motivations totals to less than
that required for action. The hybrid cases contained in the remaining triangle
can be divided into those where one motive predominates ("IVAB" where A is
stronger) or predominates over an utterly tiny secondary motivation ("IVAb",
again using the lower case to imply tininess). "'Figure 16 can be used to depict
existing legal rules, to compare them, and to imagine alternative legal rules. A
legal motive standard conditions legal outcomes by reference to some combina-
tion of these shaded regions. For example, a standard might inculpate if an act
is overdetermined (II) or in hybrid cases where A-Motive is tiny (IVBa). This
would be an Arbitrary Rule, depicted below in Figure 17 (Arbitrary Rule).
179. Appendix B summarizes that information.
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Although these regions can in turn be mixed and matched to generate over
one thousand possible motive standards,` 0 not all are attractive candidates for
law; most appear arbitrary and illogical. The rule depicted in Figure 17 is an ex-
ample of a rule without any obvious policy rationale.
Depicting all the possible motive combinations, including those entailed by
this arbitrary rule, is worthwhile as a demonstration of the neutrality of this Ar-
ticle's descriptive vocabulary. Users can decide on the properties they desire in a
18o. There are ten regions, each of which can be designated as proplaintiff or prodefendant. Thus,
there are 2A10, or 1,024, combinations. Actually, the permutations are far greater once sup-
porting rules are considered. For example, the burden of proof can shift from party to party,
so that the same compound motive standard can be styled in several ways. For example, IVaB
and II could place the burden on the plaintiff to show IVBa and II and then allow the defendant
to rebut II to reduce damages.
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motive standard and then hold any candidate standard up for consideration. The
vocabulary does not foreclose any standard, even ones that appear unappealing
at first.
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isi. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
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1501,1538 (C.D. Utah 1992) (" [A]n employee need only prove that the desire to defeat pension
eligibility was a 'motivating' or 'determinative; factor behind the challenged conduct." (quot-
ing Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 86o (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987)));
Titsch v. Reliance Grp., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (contrasting "mere con-
sequences of" with "a motivating factor"); cf Schlenz v. United Airlines, Inc., 678 F. Supp.
230, 234-36 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (rejecting Sole Motive standard); Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co.,
677 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (rejecting Sole Motive standard). See generally
Christina A. Smith, Note, The Road to Retirement-Paved with Good Intentions but Dotted with
Potholes of Untold Liability: ERISA Section 51o, Mixed Motives, and Title VII, 81 MINN. L. REV.
735 (997).
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J. 585, 622-23 (2015) ("Under current law, invidious racial discounting need not be the sole
motivating factor in order to require invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.").
188. Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3 d 8io, 815-16 (9 th Cir. 2010).
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Kease, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (S.C. 1998); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997).
191. See supra note ioi and accompanying text.
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REV. 1193, 1200-01 (2016) (describing the difference between the Title VII approach and that
under federal whistleblower protection statutes).
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598 (Ind. 2007); IMS v. Town of Portsmouth, 3 2 A. 3d 914, 930 (R.I. 2011); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 603 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); cf Hoch v. Rissman 742 So. 2d
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205. Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1976); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 285 A.2d 86 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971).
206. See, e.g., Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F 3 d 228, 236 (4 th Cit. 2004); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F 3d
982 (6th Cit. 2004); Girma v. INS, 283 F.3 d 664, 667 (5th Cit. 2002); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F 3d
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Gonzalez, 4o6 F.3 d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (" [A]n applicant must show that the persecution
was motivated, at least in part, by one of the protected characteristics"), with Gebremichael v.
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117-20 (20o6) (discussing mixed motives).
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219. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 8o6 A.2d 113, 116 (Del. 2002) ("Once a stockholder establishes
a proper purpose under § 220, the right to relief will not be defeated by the fact that the stock-
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